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Abstract 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the impact of public sector labor unions on 
member attitudes, beliefs, and values.  I expect that as union members commit to the values of 
labor organizations they will perceive lower levels of bureaucratic red tape, exhibit higher public 
service motivation (PSM), and become more satisfied with the nature of public sector work.  I 
devise and test nine hypotheses by analyzing qualitative data generated from interviews with 40 
randomly selected union members in two large Kansas cities, and quantitative data collected 
from a survey instrument distributed to over 300 municipal union members in a single Kansas 
municipality.  The qualitative findings indicate that the union context significantly influences 
perceptions of bureaucratic red tape and the motives that give rise to PSM.  The findings from a 
series of structural equation models suggest that commitment to union values decreases 
perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, enhances all four component dimensions of public service 
motivation, and indirectly increases public sector job satisfaction via bureaucratic red tape and 
PSM.  While this study supports the assertion that labor unions significantly influence the public 
sector workplace, I rebut the argument that unions primarily decrease organizational 
performance.  Rather unions could increase the performance of public sector organizations by 
encouraging members to more favorably perceive the work context, promoting member actions 
designed to benefit others, and facilitating member job satisfaction. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
After over fifty years of dramatic growth, labor unions represent a significant presence in 
the public workplace (Freeman, 1986; Kearney, 2010). Prior to the mid-twentieth century labor 
unions organized only a small proportion of the government workforce, but in the 1960s and 
1970s union activity shifted toward the public sector (Klingner, Nalbandian, & Llorens, 2010). 
The dramatic growth in public union membership began in 1962 when President John F. 
Kennedy issued executive order 10988, which legally guaranteed collective bargaining rights to 
federal employees. Although Kennedy's order covered only federal employees its effects 
increased the prevalence of bargaining rights in state and municipal government organizations as 
well.  
While changing environmental conditions in the twentieth century encouraged public 
union growth, unfavorable economic and legal characteristics reduced the prevalence of 
unionized workers in the private sector. Four primary factors reduced levels of unionization in 
the private sector. First, broad economic changes altered the composition of the workforce from 
male dominated, blue-collar occupations to more diverse, service oriented occupations. 
Furthermore, these economic changes encouraged employers to relocate to unfriendly union 
environments in southern and southwestern states. Second, increasingly prevalent “right-to-
work” laws created legal conditions that stifled private union growth. Third, public support for 
unions dwindled during this time. Finally, in the latter part of the twentieth century private 
unions devoted fewer resources to organizing new members and held fewer union certification 
elections (Kearney, 1992).  
2 
As a result of environmental changes public union members now outnumber members in 
the private sector.  Membership statistics, however, do not account for all employees represented 
by union contracts. Collective bargaining agreements often cover union members as well as non-
members in the same occupational category. As such, unions often represent more workers than 
reflected by membership rolls. Today the number of workers represented by union contracts in 
public organizations also outstrips represented workers in the private sector. As figure 1.1 
illustrates, since 1973 both union membership and union representation has shifted drastically 
toward the public sector.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1.1] 
 
These sector differences between union membership and representation are significant 
given that in 2009 there were five times more wage and salary workers in the private sector 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009b). When standardized to percentages, only approximately 7% 
of the private workforce pays dues to labor organizations, whereas just over 38% of public 
employees belong to unions. This drastic difference is compounded even further in municipal 
government organizations, where approximately 43% of the workforce claim union membership 
status (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009b).
1
  Although the proportion of public union members 
exceeds levels of union membership in private organizations, public sector ratios remain 
relatively stable.  On the other hand, the proportion of private unionized workers continues to 
                                                 
1
 Kearney (1992) points out that the increased union membership and representation at the municipal level stems 
from a few highly unionized occupations.  Among them are fire fighters, teachers, police officers, sanitation 
workers, welfare workers, highway workers, and hospital employees.  I focus solely on city government.  
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decrease.  Figure 1.2 provides nearly thirty years of membership and representation statistics by 
sector, as a percentage of the total workforce. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1.2] 
 
Statement of the Problem 
Although comparatively large numbers of public employees belong to unions, and are 
represented by collective bargaining agreements, scholars have devoted relatively little 
systematic attention toward understanding public union membership from an organizational 
psychology perspective (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992). This gap in knowledge is a 
significant omission given that scholars have speculated on a wide range of union outcomes for 
organizations, public and private. Studies suggest that unionization can divide member loyalties 
between the union and work organization (Angle & Perry, 1986; Barling, Wade, & Fullagar, 
1990), diminish intrinsic job satisfaction by emphasizing extrinsic rewards (Hammer & Avgar, 
2005; Heywood, Siebert, & Wei, 2002; Kearney, 1992), and increase sources of employee stress 
such as role conflict and ambiguity (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992).  Additionally, some 
public administration scholarship suggests that collective bargaining can lead to a decreased 
emphasis on traditional public values, such as social equity (Kearney, 1992; Klingner, et al., 
2010; Riccucci, 1988, 1990).  
 These assertions, while providing valuable insights toward understanding the impact of 
unionization on public employees, are limited in three ways.  First, public administration studies 
on unionization typically employ middle range theories associated with human resources 
management.  Although the development of middle range theories advances the exchange of 
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knowledge between public administration and other disciplines, they do not provide a unifying 
framework for seemingly unrelated findings. Second, public administration studies on unions 
often emphasize the search for practical applicability.  As such, public administration scholars 
have provided valuable recommendations to practitioners engaged in collective bargaining, but 
have tended to shy away from the more abstract intellectual challenge of examining unions as 
sources of member attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values towards their public employers.  
Finally, the absence of a unifying theoretical framework has both limited the number of 
empirical studies devoted solely to public sector unions, and generated conflicting evidence 
regarding the impacts of union membership.     
 To address these shortcomings this research will use institutional theory – oriented 
around an organizational psychology framework – to examine the impacts of unionization on 
public union members.  Unions represent a normative system that shapes social interactions 
between union members and other individuals within the organization (Kearney, 1992; Nisbet, 
1976; Parboteeah & Cullen, 2003).  Normative systems or institutions impose constraints on 
social behavior by providing the values, rules and routines, and norms that define and 
homogenize member behavior (March & Olsen, 1989; Peters & Pierre, 1998; W. R. Scott, 2008).  
Values can be defined as “conceptions of the preferred or the desirable, together with the 
construction of standards to which existing structures or behaviors can be assessed,” while norms 
“specify how things should be done; they define legitimate means to pursue valued ends” (Scott, 
2008, p. 54-55).  Viewed as social institutions, unions represent sets of norms and values that can 
influence member attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values related to organizational behavior. 
 Conventional wisdom suggests that public union values may contradict the values of the 
broader public organizations in which they are embedded.  Managing personnel in the public 
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sector involves the interaction between four traditional public values – political responsiveness 
and representation, efficiency, employee or individual rights, and social equity (Klingner, et al., 
2010).    Collective bargaining, the human resources management system favored by unions, 
values individual rights while minimizing the other traditional public values (Klingner, et al., 
2010).  Unions, as social organizations, then transmit these values to their members via the 
socialization process.  Socialization can be defined in terms of both institutional and individual 
mechanisms (Fullagar, Gallagher, Gordon, & Clark, 1995).  On the one hand, institutional 
socialization occurs when members attend formal union functions that provide “newcomers with 
a common set of experiences that are likely to elicit standardized responses,” on the other hand 
“individual socialization practices are idiosyncratic and informal” (Fullagar et al., 1995, p. 147).  
Institutional socialization occurs when members participate in meetings, and individual 
socialization occurs through informal encounters with other members.  Each of these 
socialization experiences helps define member values.  Although there is widespread belief that 
union values may contradict broader public values – such as responsiveness, efficiency, and 
equity – little empirical evidence supports this claim.   
Research Questions 
Guided by the tenets of institutional theory, I expect union membership to influence 
public employees by: shaping perceptions rule quality, influencing public service motivation, 
and altering job satisfaction.
2
  These three areas deserve theoretical attention because they have 
                                                 
2
 It is important to clarify that these three concepts are not, strictly speaking, behaviors.  However, perceived rule 
quality, public service motivation, and job satisfaction contribute to important work related behaviors such as 
turnover intentions, absenteeism, and rule bending behavior. 
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strong links to individual and organizational performance, as well as the psychological contract 
between employee and employer.  Research findings suggest that those with higher public 
service motivation perform better in public settings (Alonso & Lewis, 2001; Crewson, 1997; 
Naff & Crum, 1999), while other studies suggest that bureaucratic red tape is a significant 
impediment to organizational performance (Pandey & Moynihan, 2005). Alternatively, studies 
provide mixed findings regarding the relationship between job satisfaction and job performance, 
but evidence suggests that job satisfaction and performance are moderately positively correlated 
(Judge, Thoresen, Bono, & Patton, 2001).  Together, these three areas of organizational behavior 
significantly contribute to understanding high performing public sector workers and 
organizations. As such, it is important to understand how union membership impacts these areas 
of behavior.   
First, from an institutionalist perspective, union members may be more likely to favor 
formal organizational rules.  Formal rules and standard operating procedures represent a major 
determinant of organizational behavior by shaping the routine ways in which people act (March 
& Olsen, 1989).  Union members often attempt to structure the interactions between 
management and labor by influencing personnel procedures via the collective bargaining process 
(Kearney, 1992; Klingner, et al., 2010).  Unions seek to protect the value of individual rights by 
developing formal rules and processes that limit managerial discretion over personnel matters 
(Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Moe, 2009).   Because formal rules and standard operating 
procedures protect unionized employees from arbitrary treatment, unions may socialize members 
into believing that formal rules and procedures are beneficial.  The potential for unions, as social 
institutions, to shape members‟ perceptions of rule quality is important because rules perceived 
as good elicit stakeholder acceptance of rule requirements (DeHart-Davis, 2009b).   
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Although public administration scholars have devoted significant attention to 
pathological formal rules, or red tape, defined as “rules, regulations, and procedures that remain 
in force and entail a compliance burden but do not advance the legitimate purposes the rules 
were intended to serve” (Bozeman, 2000), relatively little research has been conducted on 
stakeholder perceptions of red tape (Bozeman, 1993; Brewer & Walker, 2010a; Feeney & 
Bozeman, 2009; Walker & Brewer, 2008).  Although individual assessments of rules are difficult 
to tap, institutional theorists frequently acknowledge that social organizations impact members' 
perceptions of their surroundings (P. L. Berger & Luckman, 1967; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
W. R. Scott, 2008).  Based on these studies the first major research question is: 
1. Do unions, by emphasizing rule-oriented protection of union values, encourage 
members to perceive less organizational red tape? 
Second, public administration scholars often argue that public institutions and 
organizations value benevolence, compassion, self-sacrifice, and social equity (Frederickson & 
Hart, 1985; Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007; Perry & Vandenabeele, 2008; Perry & Wise, 1990; 
Rainey, 1982).  On the other hand, unions emphasize individualistic values, such as employee 
rights and member solidarity (Klingner, et al., 2010).  Due to their emphasis on individualistic 
values unions are often portrayed as self-interested organizations designed to protect members at 
the expense of clients (Freeman, 1986; Moe, 2009).  These studies suggest that public union 
values may contradict broader public values, thereby attenuating public service motivation.  As 
such, the second key research question is: 
2. What is the nature of the relationship between unionization and public service 
motivation? 
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Finally, the human resource management system of collective bargaining may have a 
negative effect on employee satisfaction by characterizing the employee-employer relationship 
as one of separation rather than partnership (C. J. Berger, Olson, & Boudreau, 1983).  March and 
Olsen (1989) point out that organizational behavior stems in part from specific beliefs about 
organizational roles, and empirical findings suggest that union members are likely to perceive the 
roles of management and labor as conflicting (Barling, Kelloway, & Bremermann, 1991), or at 
least with suspicion and caution.    Increased managerial discretion over personnel policies and 
procedures frequently comes at the expense of employee rights, the fundamental value of unions, 
because union members believe managerial discretion often leads to favoritism and unfair labor 
practices.   
Union norms may also encourage employees to voice dissatisfaction with management 
and the workplace, thereby leading to job dissatisfaction (C. Brown & Medoff, 1978).  Several 
empirical studies illustrate that union membership can negatively influence overall satisfaction 
(Angle & Perry, 1986; C. J. Berger, et al., 1983; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1984; Hammer & 
Avgar, 2005; Heywood, et al., 2002).  Many scholars, however, depict the relationship between 
union membership and job satisfaction as simple and direct, and fail to account for unique 
sources of satisfaction found in public service organizations.  The final major research question 
draws together the streams of literature on bureaucratic red tape, public service motivation, and 
job satisfaction to ask: 
3. Does commitment to union values influence job satisfaction through PSM and 
perceived red tape? 
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Contributions to the Literature 
 This research will contribute to public administration scholarship in three ways.  First, it 
will provide one of the first concentrated efforts to analyze the influence of union values on 
public union members‟ attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values.  As Barling et al. (1992) point 
out relatively little social scientific research examines unions from a psychological or 
organizational behavior perspective; public administration studies reflect this bias.  Although 
public administration scholarship significantly contributes to understanding union influence on 
budgets, efficiency, and politics (J. D. Donahue, 2008; Kearney, 1992, 2010; Moe, 2006, 2009; 
Riccucci, 1990), we still know relatively little about psychological influence of union values on 
members in public settings.  By more fully examining the influence of unionization on public 
union members, this research will provide valuable insights into managing employees in heavily 
unionized public organizations.   
 Second, this project supplements the increasing public administration literature on both 
public service motivation (PSM) and bureaucratic red tape.  PSM and bureaucratic red tape are 
two important concepts unique to public administration, but knowledge on how specific 
stakeholder groups construe these phenomena is limited.  To address this limitation I present a 
broader perspective on the social construction of PSM and rule quality, by closely examining one 
particular stakeholder group – public unions.  Past research indicates that both PSM and 
bureaucratic red tape influence the behavior of public employees in important ways, and a more 
comprehensive understanding of how union membership shapes perceptions of red tape and PSM 
could contribute to creating a workplace environment where employees can be more productive 
and satisfied. 
10 
 Finally, from a practical perspective, this project can provide recommendations to 
advance the quality of the collective bargaining process and labor-management relations.  
Current recommendations suggest that participative decision-making can enhance relationship 
quality between unions and management (Kearney & Hays, 1994).  This research adds to those 
recommendations by providing specific points of discussion for participative decision-making, 
such as negotiating the content of organizational rules and balancing the intrinsic and extrinsic 
benefits of public employment.  As such, it provides recommendations for managing collective 
bargaining in such a way that managers and labor leaders can develop a common understanding 
of achieving the public interest. 
Plan of the Dissertation 
 In this chapter I acknowledge that the preeminent value of labor unions – employee and 
individual rights – can contradict the broader value sets of public institutions and organizations.  
Union values, when transmitted to members through the socialization process, play an important 
role in the developing public organizational behavior.  Although the process of unionization in 
the public sector has been well documented, knowledge regarding the impact of union values on 
member attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values remains limited.  In the chapters that follow, I 
to address these gaps in the literature by examining the relationships between union values and 
1) perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, 2) public service motivation, and 3) job satisfaction.   
 Chapter two provides a detailed account of the research design and methodological 
approach I employ in this study.  To explore the role union membership status plays in shaping 
organizational behavior this research will employ a mixed method research design.  Mixed 
method research designs capitalize on the benefits of both qualitative and quantitative analysis, 
enhance the credibility of research, and add flexibility in the search for solutions to practical 
11 
problems (Riccucci, 2010; Yang, Zhang, & Holzer, 2008).  I employ qualitative analysis to 
explore if the union context influences public service motivation, perceptions of bureaucratic red 
tape, and job satisfaction, whereas quantitative analysis examines the significance and direction 
of relationships between these variables.  This allows for a more nuanced understanding of the 
public sector union context.  The second chapter also provides a detailed explanation of the 
statistical methods utilized – confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling – and 
discusses modern procedures for analyzing missing data.   
 Chapters three, four, and five empirically test the research questions outlined above. 
Chapter three explores the relationship between union values and perceived rule quality.  Chapter 
four examines how union values influence public service motivation.  Chapter five investigates 
the mechanisms that influence the relationship between union values and job satisfaction.  To 
address these questions, each chapter conducts empirical tests to explore several hypotheses 
related to each research question.  First, I analyze qualitative data gathered from several semi-
structured interviews to explore the context of public unionization.   Second, I examine the 
responses from over 300 union members to evaluate the impact of union socialization 
experiences, the primary mechanism for communicating union values, and the degree to which 
members internalize union values, on perceptions of red tape, PSM, and job satisfaction.   
 The sixth, and final, chapter discusses the statistical results, provides concluding remarks, 
and comments on directions for future research.  First, I provide a detailed discussion of the 
quantitative and qualitative findings interpreted in the previous three chapters.  Next, this chapter 
provides statements on the significance of findings, as well as practical recommendations for 
public managers engaged in collective bargaining negotiations.  Finally, I conclude with a 
discussion of directions for future research, and unanswered research questions.  
12 
Illustrations 
Figure 1.1: Union Membership Statistics by Sector 
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Source:  Hirsch, B. T., & Macpherson, D. A. (2010). Union Membership and Coverage Database from the CPS.  
Retrieved November 13, 2010 http://unionstats.gsu.edu/ 
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Figure 1.2: Union Representation Statistics by Sector 
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Chapter 2  
Methodology, Data, and Data Analysis 
Since the origins of public administration as a self-identified field of inquiry, scholars 
have devoted attention to questions of both theoretical and practical significance.  By addressing 
theoretical and practical concerns, the field of public administration encourages substantial 
variation in research designs and methodological approaches (Riccucci, 2010).  Although most 
empirical work in public administration adheres to the logic of either quantitative or qualitative 
research methodologies, emergent research approaches allow scholars to collect, analyze, and 
integrate quantitative and qualitative data in a single study.  This research strategy, known as 
mixed methods or mixed research, benefits researchers in applied fields by drawing from 
multiple data types to aid practical decision making processes (Greene, 2007; Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 2003).   
As Riccucci (2010) points out, public administration scholars have begun to apply mixed 
methodologies to several of the field‟s important questions.  Mixed methods have been applied 
to research on public management reform efforts (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004), organizational 
rules (DeHart-Davis, 2009b), street-level bureaucracy and discretion (Maynard-Moody, 
Musheno, & Palumbo, 1990), and the tools of governance (Sandfort, Selden, & Sowa, 2008).  
This project further extends the application of mixed methods in public administration to address 
questions of public organizational behavior and management.  I employ a mixed methods 
research strategy in this project for two reasons.  First, mixed research enhances research validity 
because the strengths of one approach counteract the other‟s weaknesses (Creswell, 2009).  
Second, mixed methods research combines quantitative and qualitative approaches to provide a 
more nuanced understanding of complicated research problems (Patton, 2001). 
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the research design I employ, 
and to describe the data I use to address the core research questions.  In the first section, I explain 
mixed methods research designs and outline the variant of mixed methods research used here.  
Specifically, I provide a rationale for conducting quantitative dominant mixed research.  I argue 
that quantitative dominant mixed research seeks to integrate quantitative and qualitative data to 
add nuance to observed statistical relationships.  The second section describes the data collection 
procedures for both the quantitative and the qualitative data.  Additionally, I explain the data 
analysis techniques I employ to address the research questions presented in the previous chapter.  
Finally, I conclude with a brief summary of the chapter. 
Methodology 
Although many applied researchers agree that mixed methods research is beneficial in 
practical fields, its conceptual definition is still developing.  In fact, mixed methodologists 
continue to delineate the core components of mixed research designs.  Mixed methods research 
has been broadly defined as, “research in which the investigator collects and analyzes data, 
integrates the findings, and draws inferences using both quantitative and qualitative approaches 
or methods in a single study or program of inquiry” (Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007, p. 4).    As 
this definition illustrates, mixed methods research seeks to integrate findings from opposing data 
analytic strategies (Bryman, 2007; Woolley, 2009). Mixed methodologists consider findings 
integrated when quantitative and qualitative data are, “explicitly related to each other within a 
single study and in such a way as to be mutually illuminating, thereby producing findings that 
are greater than the sum of parts” (Woolley, 2009, p. 7).  The procedures for integrating mixed 
methods research occur along five dimensions: integration of research questions, units of 
analysis, sampling, instrumentation and data collection, and analytic strategies (Yin, 2006).  The 
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best mechanisms for data integration, however, depend on the type of mixed methods the 
researcher employs.   
Variants of mixed research emphasize either quantitative or qualitative approaches more 
heavily.  In practice, mixed methods research ranges from qualitative dominant strategies to 
quantitative dominant approaches, with pure or balanced mixed methods research falling in the 
center (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007).  Johnson, et al. (2007) argue that qualitative 
dominant approaches can be described as, “the type of mixed research in which one relies on a 
qualitative, constructivist-poststructuralist-critical view of the research process, while 
concurrently recognizing that the addition of quantitative data and approaches are likely to 
benefit most research projects,” while quantitative dominant mixed research is best understood 
as, “the type of mixed research in which one relies on a quantitative, postpositivist view of the 
research process, while concurrently recognizing that the addition of qualitative data and 
approaches are likely to benefit most research projects” (p. 124). 
This dissertation employs a quantitative dominant mixed methods research design to 
evaluate the impact of union socialization and union commitment on perceptions of bureaucratic 
red tape, public service motivation, and job satisfaction.  To compare my findings with the extant 
literature, here I employ a quantitative dominant mixed methods research design.  The vast 
majority of research on bureaucratic red tape and public service motivation has been conducted 
in the quantitative mold, but the qualitative addition in this project will enhance previously 
developed understandings of both bureaucratic red tape and PSM.  Furthermore, the qualitative 
approach may uncover additional testable hypotheses for future research.  The following section 
explains the collection strategy and analysis techniques for the qualitative data, which come from 
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a series of semi-structured interviews from randomly selected respondents, and the quantitative 
data, which is based on a survey instrument.   
Data Collection and Analysis 
Qualitative data and analysis.  In the qualitative data collection phase researchers 
conducted semi-structured interviews with randomly selected employees in the two Midwestern 
cities in the Summer and Fall of 2009.  Appendix A provides the questions contained in the 
interview protocol.  Researchers attempted to maintain the random selection of interview 
respondents.  Although researchers conducting interviews devoted substantial effort to randomly 
select participants, several individuals neglected to participate in the interview process.  Several 
random samples were drawn until researchers exceeded the ultimate goal of 100 interviews.  
When the interview phase concluded researchers collected a total of 106 interviews from 
employees across the two municipal governments.  Generally, the characteristics of interviewees 
deviate slightly from the population characteristics.  Females and non-unionized employees were 
more likely to participate in the interviews, whereas the survey sample is more representative of 
the organizational population.
1
   
Researchers recorded interview information using two methods.  First, the vast majority 
of interviews were audio recorded.  Second, researchers collected field notes in situations where 
respondents expressed discomfort with recordings.  Based on the audio recordings, researchers 
transcribed the interviews to maintain accuracy of respondent statements.  In situations where 
                                                 
1
 To ensure confidentiality of interviewees, researchers did not intentionally record identifying characteristics of 
respondents.  As such, it is impossible to generate a full summary of the demographic characteristics for all 
interview respondents.  However, based on information freely given in many interviews union membership status 
and gender is identifiable in many cases. 
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field notes were taken, researchers cleaned the notes to communicate the intent of respondent 
statements.  Because multiple researchers participated in the interview process, each interviewer 
was responsible for generating accurate transcripts based on the interviews conducted.  Each 
researcher then coded interviews for concepts of interest.  Qualitative researchers point out that 
the perspectives of researchers influence the interpretation of data throughout the analysis, as 
such it is important to acknowledge conceptual frameworks from which the research draws in an 
effort lend credence to the findings (Weston et al., 2001).  In an effort to generate qualitative data 
I drew from literatures on perceived rule quality, public service motivation, union commitment, 
and union socialization to analyze respondent comments (see Woolley, 2009 for an example of 
concept driven coding in mixed research).
2
  
I coded and analyzed interviews using Atlas.ti, a qualitative data software package 
designed to compare respondent statements.  First, respondent statements were coded broadly to 
reflect each concept of interest according to category.  Second, the narratives were broken down 
further by coding pieces of stories according to more specific sub-categories.  Third, I examined 
each subcategory determine if it reflected the presence or absence of a given attribute.  Finally, I 
used Atlas.ti to isolate instances where specific conceptual codes overlapped.  For example, I 
was able to recall any narratives that simultaneously cited the absence of institutional union 
socialization and the presence of perceived bureaucratic red tape.  To determine if the union 
                                                 
2
 It is important to note that the entire research team did not evaluate the coding schemes or qualitative data 
generated by others.  For the purposes of this project the qualitative data is analyzed to determine if the union 
context could have influenced perspectives on the dependent variables.  The qualitative analysis suggested that the 
union context warranted further quantitative analysis.  The quantitative analysis, on the other hand, is designed to 
evaluate broader probabilistic arguments regarding patterns in the attitudes, beliefs, and values of union members. 
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context influenced members, I chose to search for respondent statements that both supported and 
contradicted existing theory.  The tendencies of union members uncovered in the qualitative 
analysis were supplemented with quantitative tests of the research questions outlined in chapter 
1.  The following section describes the quantitative data analysis techniques used to explore the 
nature of relationships between union values, bureaucratic red tape, public service motivation, 
and job satisfaction. 
Quantitative data and analysis.  The quantitative data were collected from a survey of 
employees in a single city in the state of Kansas.  Kansas was chosen as the survey state as a 
matter of convenience.  The survey was distributed in the Spring and Summer of 2010, and all 
correspondence with survey respondents was based on the tailored design method for mixed-
mode surveys (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2009).  Municipal managers provided employee 
information from which researchers constructed a contact list of 1,115 potential respondents.
3
  
Each respondent in the sample received a pre-notification letter from the city manager or 
assistant city manager that introduced the study.  Although the city manager introduced the 
survey to municipal employees, researchers did not provide information to management about 
participants.  By ensuring respondent confidentiality from management researchers hoped to 
minimize potential response bias.  Following the pre-notification letter those employees with 
municipal email addresses received invitations to participate in electronic surveys, and those 
without email addresses received mail questionnaires.  Electronic surveys were supplemented by 
                                                 
3
 For the purposes of data collection a research team was assembled.  The members of the research team included 
multiple professors and graduate students from the Department of Public Administration at the University of 
Kansas. 
20 
paper surveys in the event that 1) employees did not have access to a city email address, or 2) 
respondents indicated that they preferred paper surveys.   
The invitation correspondence highlighted that participation was voluntary and 
confidential.  Following the initial communication researchers conducted follow up methods to 
contact respondents who had not yet participated.  When the study concluded 602 of the possible 
1,115 respondents completed the survey, for a response rate of 53.99%.  Table 2.1 provides the 
demographic characteristics of survey respondents.    
 
[INSERT TABLE 2.1] 
 
I use multiple items from the questionnaire to operationalize bureaucratic red tape and 
four latent constructs –public service motivation, job satisfaction, union commitment, and union 
socialization – my key dependent and independent variables.
4
  Scholars have validated several of 
the survey items used for the purposes of this project in previous research.  First, I operationalize 
perceived bureaucratic red tape using a single survey item asking respondent to assess the level 
of organizational red tape on a scale from 0-10, also known as the general red tape scale 
(Bozeman & Feeney, Forthcoming).  Second, considerable scholarly effort has been devoted to 
developing the PSM measurement scale (Coursey, Perry, Brudney, & Littlepage, 2008; Perry, 
1996).  Twelve of the PSM measures I use were validated by Coursey et al. (2008), while the 
                                                 
4
 Latent constructs differ from observed constructs because they are defined by the shared variance between multiple 
observed variables presumed to tap a common underlying phenomenon (T. A. Brown, 2006; Kline, 2005).   
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remaining measures were validated by Perry (1996).
5
  Third, I use three survey items to assess 
the presence of job satisfaction.  Fourth, to tap variation in commitment to union values I use 13 
items that have been shown to display strong psychometric properties (Kelloway, Catano, & 
Southwell, 1992).  Finally, I constructed two measures to tap union socialization.
6
  
I also employ a series of sociodemographic controls for the purposes of ruling out 
alternative explanations.  Previous research indicates that three demographic characteristics – 
race, gender, and education – are necessary model controls when conducting PSM research 
(DeHart-Davis, Marlowe, & Pandey, 2006; Perry, 1997).
7
  These variables, although often 
insignificant, are also included in research on organizational rules to limit possible alternative 
explanations (Pandey & Kingsley, 2000; Rainey, Pandey, & Bozeman, 1995; P. G. Scott & 
Pandey, 2000).  Additionally, some studies argue that social position in the organization can 
influence the way people perceive bureaucracy (Walker & Brewer, 2008).  For the purposes of 
this project I use organizational role as a proxy for social position.  Because they are the most 
heavily unionized areas of municipal government, I also included two variables to control for 
                                                 
5
 The Coursey et al. (2008) study validated twelve measures related to compassion, commitment to public interest, 
and self-sacrifice.  The Perry (1996) study validated a total of 24 items across all four PSM dimensions.  For the 
purposes of this research I employ the measures validated by Coursey et al. (2008) as well as the attraction to policy 
making items validated by Perry (1996). 
6
 As I illustrated in chapter one unions communicate values, norms and behaviors to members via institutional and 
individual mechanisms (Fullagar, et al., 1995).  As such, I constructed one survey item to tap institutional 
socialization and one item to tap individual socialization experiences. 
7
 Many studies illustrate the positive impact of professions on PSM, and some argue that professionalization 
significantly influence perceptions of bureaucratic red tape (Brewer & Walker, 2010a).  I assume here that education 
level serves as a reasonable proxy for professional status for the purposes of model control. 
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membership in police and fire unions.  A discussion of all measures used in this study can be 
found in Appendix B.   
Although a preliminary screening of the data revealed minimal missing data, all missing 
data were recovered with modern missing data analysis techniques.  Modern missing data 
techniques, such as multiple imputation or full information maximum likelihood (FIML), are 
preferable to traditional missing data techniques (e.g. listwise deletion or mean imputation) for 
two reasons.  First, they produce unbiased estimates with MCAR data; and second, they are more 
powerful because data are not needlessly discarded (Baraldi & Enders, 2010). For the purposes 
of this project I analyzed all data Mplus version 6 with FIML missing data analysis techniques 
(Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2010).   
The statistical methods I employ to analyze the quantitative data, confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) and structural equation modeling (SEM), possess several advantages over other 
statistical techniques.  First, these techniques control for measurement error by using multiple 
measures to tap underlying latent constructs.  These models create latent constructs by separating 
the unique variance for observed items from the shared variance between items presumed to 
measure the same construct (Kline, 2005).  Second, CFA and SEM allow for specifying models 
with multiple dependent variables.  Third, these techniques allow researchers to determine the 
equality of constructs across social groups (Little, 1997).   
Although CFA and SEM provide distinct advantages over other data analytic techniques, 
there are some important points to discuss in terms of model estimation and identification.  First, 
although researchers often treat survey responses as continuous they are actually ordered 
categorical variables.  Current research shows that robust weighted least squares estimation is 
theoretically appropriate when examining models with ordinal data (Flora & Curran, 2004).  To 
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address the nature of these survey responses I analyzed all variables as ordered categorical.  
When using categorical variables Mplus employs a robust weighted least squares estimator 
(WLSMV) with delta parameterization (Muthen and Muthen, 1998-2010).  Second, there are 
only two indicators for the union socialization construct.  When the number of estimated 
parameters for a latent construct exceeds the pieces of known information the construct is under 
identified, which poses problems for model estimation (T. A. Brown, 2006).  As such, I 
constrained the factor loadings associated with union meetings and union interaction to equality 
for model identification purposes.
8
   
Summary 
The purposes of this chapter were twofold.  First, I sought to provide an explanation of 
the mixed methods research design I employ.  In an effort to build on previous research findings, 
I address each research question utilizing a quantitative dominant mixed methods approach.  
Based on the quantitative dominant approach qualitative data are used to add depth to 
quantitative findings, inform development of future survey instruments, and potentially uncover 
new testable hypotheses.  Second, I provided a detailed description of the data collection and 
analysis procedures.  The quantitative data were collected based on established survey items 
from employees in a single Midwestern city in Kansas, and the qualitative data were collected 
based on over 100 semi-structured interviews from employees in those two cities in Kansas.  
                                                 
8
 Practically speaking equating factor loadings assumes that each of the manifest variables are equally good 
predictors of the latent construct.  Given that each manifest variable should tap a specific aspect of union 
socialization this assumption is reasonable. 
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These data were integrated at the analysis and interpretation stages to help interpret the 
individual influences of the union context. 
This chapter more broadly argues that mixed methods research approaches can enhance 
validity, increase practical usefulness, and facilitate a deeper understanding of research 
problems.  Enhanced validity of findings stems from the interaction of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches.  This is because the benefits of each approach complement the drawbacks 
of the other.  Likewise, mixed methods increase practical usefulness by drawing from multiple 
data types.  In particular, practical experience and statistical analyses are united to more deeply 
understand the relationship between research problems and practical recommendations.  Due to 
these benefits mixed methods research can be extremely beneficial for researchers in practical 
disciplines.     
The following chapter begins to empirically examine the relationship between union 
membership, union socialization, and perceived rule quality based on the mixed methods 
approach described above.  In particular, I seek to determine how union socialization and the 
degree to which members internalize union values influences perceptions of bureaucratic red 
tape.   
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Illustrations 
Table 2.1: Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents 
Percent
Gender
     Female 41.2%
     Male 56.2%
     Missing 2.6%
Race
     American Indian 2.2%
     Asian/Pacific Islander 1.4%
     Black 14.5%
     Hispanic 6.5%
     White 70.5%
     Missing 4.9%
Education
     High School/GED 10.2%
     Some College 32.7%
     Bachelor's Degree 18.2%
     Some Graduate School 3.7%
     Graduate Degree 11.2%
     Other 4.7%
     Missing 19.4%
Union Membership
     Union Member 40.6%
     Non-Union Member 39.6%
     Missing 19.8%
Organizational Role
     Department Head 2.5%
     Superintendant 4.2%
     Administrative/Policy Staff 5.5%
     Supervisor 18.9%
     Lead Worker 22.3%
     Clerical 13.6%
     Technical 12.7%
     Missing 20.3%  
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Chapter 3  
Unionization and Organization Structure: The Influence of Unionization on Stakeholder Red 
Tape 
 Although union membership continues to dwindle in the private sector public unions, 
particularly in municipal government, remain healthy (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009b; 
Kearney, 1992, 2010).  As such, over the past thirty years scholars have devoted significant 
attention to the organizational outcomes arising from collective bargaining agreements in the 
public sector.  Collective bargaining, and the resulting labor contract, significantly influence 
organizational performance (J. D. Donahue, 2008; Moe, 2009), political and organizational lines 
of authority (Chandler & Gely, 1996; Moe, 2006), managerial discretion over personnel 
processes (A. K. Donahue, Selden, & Ingraham, 2000; Klingner, et al., 2010), and the content of 
formal work rules negotiated through collective bargaining (Freeman, 1976; Freeman & Medoff, 
1984; Katz, 1993).  Despite advances in understanding the organizational outcomes of collective 
bargaining public management studies have largely neglected the role public unionization plays 
in shaping union members‟ attitudes toward formal organizational rules.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Although collective bargaining affords union members the opportunity to influence only those workplace rules 
negotiated as a part of labor contracts, substantial numbers of non-negotiated rules also impact union members.  As 
such, union members may view collectively negotiated rules as beneficial, because they actively participate in 
formulating those rules, whereas non-negotiated rules may be viewed as either neutral or pathological.  For the 
purposes of this project the term “formal organizational rules” refers to the totality of workplace rules, both 
negotiated and non-negotiated, union members regularly confront in the course of completing work obligations.  
This chapter comports with previous research on organizational rules by examining perceptions of organizational 
rules from “multiple actors … responding to an arguably similar set of administrative rules, procedures, and 
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Several empirical studies in public management, however, have analyzed the causes and 
consequences of pathological organizational rules - or bureaucratic red tape (Bozeman, 1993, 
2000; Bozeman, Reed, & Scott, 1992; DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005; Pandey, Coursey, & 
Moynihan, 2007; Pandey & Kingsley, 2000; Pandey & Moynihan, 2005; P. G. Scott & Pandey, 
2005).  During this time scholarly research has largely emphasized red tape as an objective 
organizational characteristic.  On the other hand, more recent scholarship calls for examining 
bureaucratic red tape from a multiple stakeholder perspective (Feeney & Bozeman, 2009).
2
  This 
chapter examines perceptions bureaucratic red tape from the perspective of one particular 
municipal government stakeholder group, union members.    
 It is important to examine unions as a source of stakeholder red tape because, by 
emphasizing contractually established, rule-oriented protections of employee rights, unions may 
socialize into members the belief that formal organizational rules are beneficial and necessary.  
Many studies depict unions as an important rule making body in both public and private 
organizations (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992; Ingraham, 2006; Jackson, Schuler, & Carlos 
Rivero, 1989; Klingner, et al., 2010).  Several scholars, however, view union established rules as 
an impediment to individual and organizational performance (A. K. Donahue, et al., 2000; J. D. 
                                                                                                                                                             
behaviors within a shared relationship,” (Feeney and Bozeman, 2009, p, 711).  In this case the shared relationship is 
membership in labor organizations. 
2
 Although Bozeman (1993) elaborates on the concept of stakeholder red tape, he does not explicitly define the term 
stakeholder.  Rather he provides several types of stakeholder types including, the parent agency, political 
institutions, intraorganizational coalitions, and organizational clients.  In line with previous red tape research, I use 
the term stakeholder in reference to a specific intraorganizational coalition.  In this case however, stakeholder refers 
more specifically to an intraorganizational coalition, the labor union, characterized by a social system that 
encourages shared attitudes, beliefs, and values.  
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Donahue, 2008), but when individuals perceive rules as good they are more likely to voluntarily 
comply with rules‟ formal requirements (DeHart-Davis, 2007, 2009b).  Voluntary rule 
compliance, in turn, is likely more efficient and less costly for the work organization compared 
to forced compliance (DeHart-Davis, 2009b; Tyler, 2006).  
 This chapter explores the influence of union socialization and member commitment to 
union values on perceptions of bureaucratic red tape by drawing from organizational psychology, 
public human resources management, and bureaucratic red tape theory.  I begin by connecting 
the literature on labor unions and bureaucratic red tape to develop two hypotheses regarding the 
relationships between union socialization, commitment to union values, and perceptions of red 
tape. The next section presents qualitative results based on several semi-structured interviews 
conducted with randomly selected union members in two municipal governments, and 
quantitative results based on information collected from over 300 municipal union members.  
Next, I briefly discuss the empirical findings presented in the chapter.  Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a summary of the theoretical arguments and concluding statements regarding the 
relationship between unionization and perceived red tape. 
Union Socialization, Union Commitment, and Stakeholder Red Tape 
Research examining the effects of unions on organizations took shape with the 
identification of primary and secondary collective bargaining outcomes (Kochan, 1980; Kochan 
& Helfman, 1981).  Kochan (1980) characterized the primary outcomes of collective bargaining 
as the rule oriented employee protections that often dominate union agendas (e.g. higher 
compensation levels, increased job security, and better working conditions), whereas secondary 
outcomes reflect union member attitudes and behaviors that evolve from the contractually 
defined relationships between management and unions (e.g. employee productivity, turnover 
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intentions, absenteeism, and job dissatisfaction) (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992).  
Importantly, it is the social activities of unions that link organizational characteristics to member 
attitudes and behaviors. 
In fact, some scholars theoretically establish unions as institutions that are “at bottom 
social structures and hence responsive in their activities to the same basic needs, interests, and 
loyalties which we find in the relationships of individuals to all major groups” (Nisbet, 1976, p. 
13).  Social structures homogenize member beliefs, perceptions, and behaviors by 
communicating institutional values to members (March & Olsen, 1989; Peters & Pierre, 1998; 
W. R. Scott, 2008).  In particular, collective bargaining, the human resources management 
system favored by unions, is strongly tied to values associated with individual and employee 
rights (Klingner, et al., 2010).  Unions, in turn, protect these values by establishing formal 
organizational rules in the labor contract that limit managerial discretion (Freeman & Medoff, 
1984; Kearney, 1992; Klingner, et al., 2010; Moe, 2009).   It is also important to note that social 
structures are maintained, in part, by inculcating  members with institutional values through the 
socialization process (P. L. Berger & Luckman, 1967; W. R. Scott, 2008).   
Unions socialize members through two mechanisms, institutional and individual 
(Fullagar, et al., 1995).  Institutional socialization reflects participation in formal union functions 
(e.g. union sponsored meetings) that provide “newcomers with a common set of experiences that 
are likely to elicit standardized responses,” whereas “individual socialization practices are 
idiosyncratic and informal” (Fullagar et al., 1995, p. 147).  As Barling et al. (1992) point out; the 
extent to which members participate in union activities influences organizational performance as 
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well as member behaviors.
3
  Although union socialization experiences strongly encourage 
member commitment to union values (Gordon, Philpot, Burt, Thompson, & Spiller, 1980), it is 
also important to account for the varying degrees to which members internalize and accept union 
goals and values (Newton & Shore, 1992).   
Commitment to the union specifically involves “a definite belief in, and acceptance of, 
the values and goals of the organization” (Gordon, et al., 1980; Porter & Smith, 1970).  Union 
members display differing levels of commitment to union values that range from member 
alienation to internalization of union values (Newton & Shore, 1992).  As Newton and Shore 
(1992) suggest, unions possess the capacity to influence the perceptions and attitudes of 
members.   As such, it is important to examine internalization of union values as a major 
determinate of workplace perceptions (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992).  Although labor 
unions represent an important social structure within municipal government, research has yet to 
investigate labor union‟s preference for rule-oriented value protections, and the degree to which 
members accept those values, as a determinate of member attitudes toward formal organizational 
rules.   
Research on the causes and consequences of red tape, defined as ineffective formal 
organizational rules, occupies a dominant place in public management literature.  Public 
management scholarship examining bureaucratic red tape originated with Kaufman‟s book 
                                                 
3
 Barling et al. (1992) focus on the strike as the primary element of union participation.  They illustrate that strikes 
can lead to negative psychological consequences (e.g. stress and role conflict) for unionized employees.  There are 
multiple avenues, however, for participating in union activities.  Rather than focusing on strikes this research 
examines participation in formal union meetings and informal social activities as the major elements of union 
participation.    
31 
length treatment (Kaufman, 1977), but empirical red tape research increased dramatically 
following Bozeman‟s efforts to develop a theory of government red tape (Bozeman, 1993).  In 
contrast to Kaufman‟s work, which points to potentially beneficial elements of red tape, 
Bozeman‟s (1993, 2000) scholarship theoretically establishes red tape as bureaucratic pathology.  
Bozeman conceptualized bureaucratic red tape in two ways.   
Bozeman‟s first conceptualization, based on the organizational elements of red tape, was 
defined as “rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance 
burden for the organization but have no efficacy for the rules‟ functional object” (Bozeman, 
1993, p. 283).  Later theory development incorporates the inability of a rule to “advance the 
legitimate purposes the rules were intended to serve” as a component of bureaucratic red tape 
(Bozeman, 2000, p. 12).  The second conceptualization, termed stakeholder red tape, accounts 
for individual variation in perceived red tape.  Stakeholder red tape was defined as 
“organizational rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance 
burden, but serve no object valued by a given stakeholder group” (Bozeman, 1993, p. 284).  
Although the construct has been operationally defined in multiple ways (Bozeman & Feeney, 
Forthcoming; Chen & Williams, 2007; Pandey, et al., 2007; Pandey & Garnett, 2006; Pandey & 
Kingsley, 2000; Rainey, et al., 1995; P. G. Scott & Pandey, 2005), theoretically bureaucratic red 
tape always reflects rules with a compliance burden that inhibit organizational performance or 
purposes (Bozeman, 2000; DeHart-Davis, 2007; DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005; Pandey, et al., 
2007).   
Although the bulk of empirical red tape work in public management examines 
organizational red tape, more recent research explores red tape as a subject-dependent construct 
(Brewer & Walker, 2010a, 2010b; Feeney & Bozeman, 2009; Walker & Brewer, 2008).  Red 
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tape, when defined as a subject-dependent phenomenon, is tied to specific value sets associated 
with coalitions of interests (Bozeman, 1993).  Because stakeholder red tape is closely tied to 
institutional values, social structures (e.g. markets and professions (Brewer & Walker, 2010a)) 
possess the capacity to influence individual perceptions of organizational rules.  The following 
sections examine how one particular social institution, the labor union, directly shapes the way 
members experience bureaucratic red tape through socialization, and how the degree to which 
members internalize union values affect member perceptions of red tape.
4
  
Union Socialization and Bureaucratic Red Tape.  Bureaucratic red tape cannot exist in 
the absence of burdensome rules that inhibit organizational purposes (Bozeman, 1993, 2000; 
DeHart-Davis, 2007; DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005; Pandey, et al., 2007).  However, it is 
possible for different stakeholder groups to perceive varying degrees of bureaucratic red tape 
(Bozeman, 1993).  If unions, as social institutions, influence the attitudes and values of members 
through socialization the question remains: How do unions influence the degree to which 
members perceive formal organizational rules as burdensome and detrimental to organizational 
purposes?  The labor relations literature in public management and related fields provides 
conflicting answers to this question. 
                                                 
4
 I argue that unions are an important source of red tape perceptions for two reasons. First, similar to the argument 
presented by Feeney and Bozeman (2009), unions represent one of several stakeholder groups interacting within 
public organizations.  Unions and management must respond to identical administrative rules and procedures, which 
are collectively established as a part of the bargaining process.  Second, as much of the research on union 
socialization and commitment suggests, unions effectively influence member attitudes and perceptions (Barling, 
Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992) 
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On the one hand, labor unions use the collective bargaining process to develop formal 
work rules and procedures to protect valued employee rights (Ingraham, 2006; Klingner, et al., 
2010).  In fact, several empirical studies validate the formal rule making capability – particularly 
related to human resources policies and procedures – of union‟s bargaining activities.  For 
example, Jackson, Schuler, and Carlos Rivero illustrate that unions effectively shape personnel 
practices for hourly employees (Jackson, et al., 1989).  Thus, unions establish workplace rules to 
provide members with greater control over workplace issues, which limit feelings of exploitation 
and alienation (Barling, et al., 1991).  Based on these research findings unions may socialize into 
members the belief that organizational rules are neutral – perhaps even good – because they are 
integral for protecting union values.  Alternatively, other groups (e.g. managers) may view these 
rules as red tape, because they value different organizational objectives. 
On the other hand, union members are likely to perceive the relationship between 
management and labor as conflicting (Barling, et al., 1991).  This observation suggests that, 
while unions influence organizational rules via collective bargaining, not every rule has union 
blessing.  In fact, some scholars point out that unionized employees can be inherently skeptical 
toward organizational rule purposes, even in the process of creating them.  For example, unions 
have historically opposed rules, regulations, and procedures designed to encourage minority 
employment (e.g. Equal Opportunity Employment and Affirmative Action) (Riccucci, 1988, 
1990).  Additionally, unions often perceive personnel rules and regulations, such as pay-for-
performance plans, as invalid because they rely too heavily upon arbitrary managerial discretion 
in the decision making process (Meyer, 1975).  Union opposition to these organizational rules 
may stem from member perception that, because they contradict union member rights, rule 
purposes are not legitimate.  Based on these studies unions may socialize into members the belief 
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that organizational rules that are not the product of formal negotiations are more likely to be 
pathological thereby generating red tape.  Although conflicting theoretical expectations make it 
difficult to determine the directionality of the relationship between union socialization and 
perceived red tape, due to potentially contentious relationships between union members and 
management, I do expect that:  
 
H1: More socialized union members will perceive higher red tape than less socialized 
union members. 
 
Union Commitment and Bureaucratic Red Tape.  Bureaucratic red tape, when examined 
from a multiple stakeholder perspective, reflects specific value sets associated with several 
stakeholder groups including intra-organizational coalitions (Bozeman, 1993).  However, in his 
theoretical explanation of stakeholder red tape Bozeman (1993) argues that, “a rule that is red 
tape for one group may not be red tape for another group, even for one in the same category” (p. 
285).  Although collective bargaining, by protecting values that unions perceive as necessary, 
provides a framework by which members can understand the validity of organizational rules 
union members often vary substantially in the degree to which they internalize union values 
(Newton & Shore, 1992).  Because some union members accept union values more completely it 
is important to examine how union commitment influences member perceptions of rule 
pathology, not distinguishing between organizational rules that are negotiated and those that are 
not.   The labor relations research in public management, however, is much clearer on the 
directionality of the relationship between union commitment and perceived red tape.   
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As Klingner, Nalbandian, and Llorens (2010) point out, collective bargaining is a human 
resources management sub-system that expresses the abstract value of employee and individual 
rights.  The protection of union values, in turn, is always rule or process oriented.  In fact, 
heavily unionized work environments operate under work rules that are more numerous and 
precise compared to nonunion work environments (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Gallagher, 1983).  
Some studies even illustrate that union-advocated work rules limit the capacity of public human 
resources managers to make personnel decisions (A. K. Donahue, et al., 2000).  While these 
studies indicate that unionized work environments have a greater rule sum
5
, they do not provide 
evidence illustrating how union members perceive organizational rules, both negotiated and 
imposed. 
The degree to which union members view these rules as red tape is dependent upon the 
degree to which they perceive the values of the union as legitimate.  Union commitment 
conceptually reflects the degree to which union members internalize and accept the values, goals, 
and purposes of the labor organization and legitimate (Gordon, et al., 1980).
6
  Furthermore, 
research findings empirically link union commitment to member perceptions of organizational 
climate (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992).  Furthermore, many public management scholars 
argue that bureaucratic red tape is an important component of public organizations‟ climate 
(Bozeman & Loveless, 1987; Rainey, et al., 1995).  As such, it is reasonable to conclude that 
                                                 
5
 Early efforts to theoretically describe bureaucratic red tape introduced the term rule sum in reference to “the total 
number of written rules, procedures, and regulations in force for an organization” (Bozeman, 1993, p. 280).   
6
 Successive research provides psychometric support illustrating that union commitment can be conceptualized as a 
higher order construct comprised of three component dimensions, willingness to work for the union, loyalty to the 
union, and responsibility to the union (Kelloway, et al., 1992).   
36 
commitment to union values is inextricably bound to perceptions of bureaucratic red tape.  Based 
on evidence suggesting that the union‟s value protections are always rule-oriented, and that 
union commitment influences attitudes toward organizational climate it is reasonable to expect 
that: 
 
H2: Union members who are more committed to union values will perceive less red tape 
in the organization as a whole than union members less committed to union values. 
 
 Model Controls.  Although the primary emphasis of this chapter focuses on the 
relationship between unionization and bureaucratic red tape, it is also important to control for 
potential alternative explanations.  First, some suggest that women perceive bureaucracy and 
formal rules differently from men (DeHart-Davis, 2009a).  Although much of the literature on 
bureaucratic red tape finds that race and gender are often insignificant (Pandey & Kingsley, 
2000; Rainey, et al., 1995; P. G. Scott & Pandey, 2000), those demographic characteristics 
should be included in research on organizational rules to limit possible alternative explanations.  
Second, recent research treating red tape as subject-depended finds that the professions and 
social position in organizations are important characteristics that shape perceptions of red tape 
(Brewer & Walker, 2010a; Walker & Brewer, 2008).  I assume here that education level serves 
as a reasonable proxy for professional status, and that organizational role serves as a proxy for 
social position.
7
  Finally, it is important not to assume all unions display the same behaviors and 
                                                 
7
 For the purposes of this research the education variable was dichotomized to separate individuals with bachelor‟s 
degree from those individuals without.  Likewise, the organizational role variable was dichotomized to separate 
those individuals in management roles from rank-and-file employees.   
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attitudes.  Police and fire departments are the most heavily unionized areas of municipal 
government.  As such, I include two dummy variables to control for membership in police and 
fire unions.  The following section presents qualitative findings that suggest the union context 
influences perceptions of red tape, as well as statistical tests of the research hypotheses.    
Findings 
Analysis of Qualitative Data.  To explore whether the union context had any bearing on 
perceptions of organizational rules before conducting quantitative tests, I analyzed qualitative 
data generated from semi-structured interviews conducted with 40 union members.  Overall, 
more than 100 interviews were collected from several randomly selected municipal employees 
who were both unionized and non-unionized.  While the interviews focused primarily on 
employee perceptions of rule quality, many employees were also asked to comment on attitudes 
toward unions.  Because the purpose of this chapter is to examine bureaucratic red tape from the 
perspective of union members, I analyze interviews from those who commented specifically on 
organizational rules and freely offered information regarding their affiliation with municipal 
labor organizations.  The vast majority of interviews were conducted with unionized police 
officers and firefighters, because those are the most heavily unionized departments.  Although 
unionization status was clear in these interviews, it is not always explicitly stated to which union 
the interviewees belong.  In the respondent statements provided below I provide union affiliation 
when it is possible.  I do not provide union affiliation and rank when that information would 
reveal the identity of a specific individual. 
In accordance with the argument that unions serve important rule-making functions from 
the perspective of members, some unionized employees viewed the union as a mechanism for 
ensuring that of organizational rules serve important purposes.  Furthermore, union members 
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view many organizational rules as necessary for ensuring equity among employees.  For 
example, a unionized administrative assistant described her perspective on the municipal sick 
leave policy by saying that, 
 
“We get about a three [hours of sick time] per pay period.  Sometimes they doctor that at 
the city, but usually if you call them on it they'll stop because of the union.  I have known 
them to let somebody use sick time because they were out of vacation [time].  Well, I 
really have an issue with that, because [supervisors] single out their favorites to let do 
this.  Sometimes I will use vacation for an appointment if it's it two hour appointment, 
because I have more vacation time.  [The city] tried to tell me I can‟t do that, but I said I 
can use my vacation for anything I want.  I had to show them the [union] contract on that 
one.”  
 
This employee suggests that, while sick leave could only be used under specific circumstances, 
the labor contract specified that employees could use vacation leave at their discretion.  For her, 
the union contract was designed to ensure that the leave policies achieved these purposes, and to 
guarantee that those rules were equitably applied. 
 The perspective that formal rules serve important purposes tends to resonate with both 
rank-and-file union members as well as union leadership.  In fact, some union leaders tended to 
emphasize that formal rules advanced union, as well as public, values.  To illustrate this 
perspective a vice president of a public employees union lamented the lack of formal 
organizational rules to govern the municipality‟s use of health insurance funds.  He stated that, 
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 “One of the big [rules] issues is health insurance. There are no rules in writing for how 
the health insurance fund will be administered.  It‟s worth several million dollars right 
now and there is no standard procedure as to how that fund should be managed, 
administered, or how funds should be deposited. … We [the union] have an ordinance 
under consideration for establishing parameters that specify how the [insurance] fund will 
be managed. …We need rules for transparency.” 
 
While some union members tend to hold rules established in the labor contract in high 
regard, they also tended to view rules advocated by management with some suspicion.  The 
public employee union steward also noted that disputes over the content of organizational rules 
can create a rift between labor and management.  He explained that management uses a “divide 
and conquer” strategy to create “a norm of them against us.”  Due to this divide the union 
steward perceived the union‟s proposed policy on the health insurance fund as “good for the 
employees and citizenry,” but noted that the municipality was reluctant to implement the union‟s 
preferred rule provisions.  In fact, with respect to the municipality‟s current procedures regarding 
the maintenance of the health insurance fund the union steward wondered “what‟s taking place 
underneath the table? … Is this a fact of the way [the city] government has run for years and 
wants to keep it running? Or are there some other reasons?”  Because union and management 
were unable to agree upon formal rule terms, this union vice president called into question the 
legitimacy of current rules governing the insurance fund, perhaps to the extent that they 
generated red tape. 
Although contentious negotiations between labor and management can color perceptions 
of rules and red tape, some unionized employees perceive a strong link between union 
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membership status and respect for rules.  A unionized engineering technician, also discussing the 
city leave policies, described her perspective toward the rules by stating, “I know I have to give 
at least two days notice if I want to take vacation, and I think that's in the union contract. So 
being a dues paying member, I respect that rule.”  In fact, a field employee in a municipal water 
department succinctly summarized the positive relationship between collective bargaining 
contracts and union member perceptions toward organizational rules when he stated, “we [water 
department employees] are governed by union contract, which is for the most part cut and dried, 
black and white. I can‟t bash [those work rules] because the work rules in the contract are jointly 
set [by labor and management] and have been negotiated at the table.” 
Negative perspectives of work rules established in the contract were somewhat less 
common, but the comments of unionized employees revealed that union work rules usurping the 
authority of the municipality could be an important source of red tape.  For instance, a field 
worker in a horticulture department, who is protected by the union contract but chooses not to 
pay dues, expounded on union‟s negative influence over organizational rules by saying,  
 
“The [city‟s] rules are fair, and I really didn't see much change in what may be done in 
bargaining.  I just I didn't know if [collective bargaining] was necessary, so that‟s 
probably why I didn't vote for the union. 
 
This particular employee, like the office assistant, valued equity, but viewed organizational rules 
as a mechanism to obtain equitable treatment.  Because he perceived that rules were already 
equitable, he did not view the union as a necessary protection for employee rights.  In fact, the 
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water employee cited above also suggested that union contracts could develop rules that 
encouraged, rather than suppressed, preferential treatment.  He stated specifically, 
 
“Preferential treatment I see all across the city, whether it‟s in other divisions, other 
departments, or union contracts. [There is a] lot of resentment in this town over [two 
other departments], who pretty much walk on water. When it comes to negotiating union 
contracts [in those departments] there is a lot of stuff that seems given.  Those contracts 
seem to get preferential treatment.  
 
These examples illustrate that there is some variation in the way union members perceive 
organizational rules.  Specifically, union member‟s perception of rules can change based on both 
the content of the rules and the stakeholder group advocating the rules.  First, the union members 
cited here tend to emphasize equitable treatment as an important protection offered by 
organizational rules.  Second, union members differ on whether they perceive the union or the 
work organization as the primary advocate of equitable treatment.  Although the qualitative 
findings I present cannot be considered generalizable to all union members, these stories suggest 
that the union context may shape attitudes toward organizational rules and bureaucratic red tape.  
The next section conducts a quantitative analysis to examine the nature of relationships between 
unionization and perceptions of bureaucratic red tape.        
Analysis of Quantitative Data.  Before describing the statistical results, there are some 
important points to discuss in terms of model specification.  First, previous research suggests that 
it is best to conceptualize union commitment as a higher order construct comprised of three 
component dimensions (Kelloway, et al., 1992).  As such, I constrained each of the pathways 
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between the component dimensions of union commitment and bureaucratic red tape to zero.  
This allows for analysis of the relationship specifically between union commitment and 
bureaucratic red tape.  Second, there are only two indicators for the union socialization construct.  
As such, the construct is considered under identified, which occurs when the number of 
estimated parameters exceeds the pieces of known information (T. A. Brown, 2006).  Because 
this can pose problems for estimation, I constrained the factor loadings associated with union 
meetings and union interaction to equality for model identification purposes.
8
  Finally, in the 
diagram bureaucratic red tape is depicted as a box because it represents a single questionnaire 
item.  
The findings illustrated in the structural model suggest that the model fits the data well.  
General guidelines suggest that .08RMSEA , .90CFI  , and .90NNFI   indicate good fitting 
models (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993; Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004).  The model illustrated in figure 
3.1 equals or surpasses the cutoff criteria for all three fit measures.  Because all three measures 
indicate good model fit it is reasonable to proceed with analysis of specific parameters related to 
the hypothesized relationships.   
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3.1] 
 
Although the model I present in figure 3.1 illustrates the nature of relationships between 
union socialization, union commitment, and bureaucratic red tape it does not provide 
                                                 
8
 Practically speaking equating factor loadings assumes that each of the manifest variables are equally good 
predictors of the latent construct.  Given that each manifest variable should tap a specific aspect of union 
socialization this assumption is reasonable. 
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significance tests for each regression parameter.  Both of the hypothesized regression parameters 
significantly contribute to overall model fit.  To determine significance, I tested each of the 
hypothesized relationship using the 
2 difference test option for categorical variables in Mplus.
9
  
The results of 
2 difference testing indicate that constraining either of the latent regression 
parameters to zero would cause a significant decrease in model fit. Table 3.1 illustrates changes 
in model fit and associated significance levels for each regression parameter.  It is also important 
to note that while each of the beta paths are significant, the model explains a relatively modest 
proportion of variance in red tape, 6.1%.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3.1] 
 
Given that each hypothesized parameter is significant, the results I present in figure 3.1 
illustrate the nature of relationships between union socialization, union commitment, and 
bureaucratic red tape.  First, the bidirectional (psi) path between union socialization and union 
commitment can be interpreted as a zero order correlation.  Union socialization and union 
commitment are highly correlated, which suggests that greater participation in union 
socialization is accompanied by greater internalization of union values.  Second, the 
unidirectional (beta) paths between 1) union socialization and red tape and 2) union commitment 
                                                 
9
 The table illustrates the change in model fit when the beta paths between bureaucratic red tape and both union 
socialization and union commitment were constrained to zero.  Due to the use of categorical variables the difference 
test is not distributed as a 
2 value.  The 2 column provides an accurate depiction of overall change in model 
fit.   
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and red tape can be interpreted as standardized regression coefficients.
10
  Consistent with 
expectations employees who report more engagement in union socialization activities also report 
significantly higher perceptions of bureaucratic red tape.  Also consistent with expectations, 
those union members who report greater commitment to union values perceive significantly less 
bureaucratic red tape.  Although union socialization and commitment to union values are highly 
correlated (r = .782), they influence perceived red tape differently.  This may occur because 
socialization through meeting attendance and informal gatherings encourages members to 
complain to one another about the content of rules.  Commitment to union values, however, is a 
more individualistic process.  Those individuals committed to union values are more willing to 
work for the union‟s benefit, display loyalty toward the union, and feel responsible for advancing 
the union.  As opposed to casual union members who simply attend meetings and informal 
gatherings, committed union members may be more likely to be directly involved in the 
bargaining process.  When members are directly involved in bargaining they may feel more 
autonomous with respect to the work organization, and, in turn, viewing organizational 
characteristics more favorably. 
Finally, the model controls reveal no significant relationships between sociodemographic 
categories and bureaucratic red tape. Similar to previous research (Pandey & Kingsley, 2000; 
Rainey, et al., 1995; P. G. Scott & Pandey, 2000), the findings I present suggest that neither 
gender nor race directly influences perceptions of bureaucratic red tape.  Additionally, education 
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 Because this article hypothesizes about the regression parameters between union socialization, union commitment 
and red tape I did not include covariates in the diagram.  Although none of the model controls were significant, all 
were left in the model to rule out alternative explanations.  Table 3.2 provides the estimates related to model 
controls.   
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and organizational role do not influence respondents‟ perceptions of red tape.  This finding is 
contrary to previous empirical tests suggesting that professions and social position in the 
organization shape perceptions of red tape (Brewer & Walker, 2010a; Walker & Brewer, 2008)  
Table 3.2 provides the parameter estimates and associated significance levels for the 
relationships bureaucratic red tape control variables.    
 
[INSERT TABLE 3.2] 
 
Discussion 
Some scholars examining bureaucratic red tape have pointed out that red tape is best 
understood as a subject-dependent construct (Brewer & Walker, 2010a; Walker & Brewer, 
2008).  As such, researchers have called for a renewed research emphasis on exploring 
bureaucratic red tape from the perspective of various stakeholder groups (Feeney & Bozeman, 
2009).  This chapter examined one stakeholder group that possesses the capability to influence 
perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, the labor union.  I argue that labor unions are, at their 
foundation, social institutions that shape the way members perceive bureaucracy and formal 
rules.   
The labor relations literature in public administration provides conflicting expectations 
regarding the influence of union socialization and commitment to union values on perceptions of 
bureaucratic red tape.  A significant amount of empirical research suggests that unions establish 
formal work rules to protect valued employee rights (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Klingner, et al., 
2010), but that the relationship between labor and management could potentially be 
characterized by conflicting views on organizational purposes (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 
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1992).  These findings suggest that casual union members may become disillusioned by 
perceived contentious relationships between union and management, leading to the belief that 
formal work rules amount to red tape.  On the other hand, the value protections unions favor are 
always rule or process oriented.  However, union members vary in the extent to which they view 
the values of the union as legitimate (Gordon, et al., 1980; Newton & Shore, 1992).  As such, 
members who more fully commit to union values are more likely to view formal rules as 
beneficial protections of employee rights. 
The evidence I report here, both quantitative and qualitative, illustrates that unions serve 
as an important social institution that influences the way members perceive organizational rules.  
While the qualitative findings do not formally test the research hypotheses, they provide two 
important insights that contribute to understanding stakeholder perceptions of bureaucratic red 
tape.  First, the qualitative findings support the argument of Feeney and Bozeman (2009) that 
stakeholder groups acting under the same organizational rules can perceive those rules 
fundamentally differently.  In this case, the stories provided my municipal union members 
illustrate that many union members perceive rules as necessary protections of employee rights.  
In particular, many union members cited the rule‟s ability to ensure equitable treatment of 
employees as the major benefit of most organizational rules.  However, some union members, 
protected by the same collective agreements, perceived that the existing work rules advocated by 
management facilitated equity.  Thus, from the perspective of these members, union rules were 
perceived as needless and duplicative.   
Second, the qualitative findings support the argument that participative decision-making 
in labor relations can have important and positive consequences for employee attitudes (Kearney 
& Hays, 1994).  In these examples, union members who tended to emphasize the collective 
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bargaining process as an opportunity to establish common interests viewed organizational rules 
more favorably.  On the one hand, the municipal water employee commented that he perceived 
the rules governing his department as legitimate because they were jointly established by the 
union and management.  The story provided by the public employee union vice president, on the 
other hand, suggested that the rules governing the insurance fund were illegitimate.  The 
illegitimacy of those rules stemmed partially from the reluctance of management to solicit union 
input while developing the rules formal requirements.  For these union members, bureaucratic 
red tape originates from not only the legitimacy of the rule‟s functional object, but also from the 
mechanism by which rules are created. Future research could seek to uncover not only the 
differing levels of red tape perceived by specific stakeholder groups, but also how collaborative 
rule-making influences the amount of red tape perceived by stakeholder groups.    
While the qualitative results provide evidence suggesting that the union context 
significantly influences perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, they do not provide evidence 
regarding the nature of relationships between union socialization, union commitment, and 
bureaucratic red tape.  The structural model I report suggests that both union socialization and 
union commitment play an important role in inculcating members with values and beliefs tied to 
perceptions of red tape.  It is important to note that while the model explains a relatively modest 
proportion of variance in bureaucratic red tape (6.1%), the fit indices suggest that this model is 
an accurate representation of population characteristics.  Furthermore, the model results confirm 
the hypotheses that union socialization and commitment to union values significantly influence 
members‟ perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, both in the direction expected.    
Perhaps the most interesting finding is that union socialization and union commitment 
influence perceptions of bureaucratic red tape differently.  Whereas more socialized union 
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members perceive significantly higher levels of bureaucratic red tape compared to less socialized 
members, those union members who more fully accept and internalize union values perceive 
significantly lower levels of red tape.  The finding that union socialization encourages members 
to perceive higher levels of red tape supports the thesis that casual union members can become 
disillusioned by contentious relationships between labor and management (Barling, Fullagar, & 
Kelloway, 1992), which may contribute to negative perceptions of bureaucracy.  This finding 
also supports the argument that more interaction with the union may cause members to voice 
dissatisfaction with the organization (Freeman, 1980), thereby facilitating negative perceptions 
of the work climate.  On the other hand, the finding that commitment to union values encourages 
members to perceive lower levels of bureaucratic red tape supports the thesis that unions seek to 
protect valued employee rights by establishing formal rules in the labor contract (Freeman & 
Medoff, 1984; Klingner, et al., 2010), which can cause more favorable perceptions of the work 
climate.   
The magnitude of these relationships, however, provides additional insights into the 
overall influence of unionization on member perceptions of bureaucratic red tape.  In these data 
the negative consequences of union socialization on perceived bureaucratic red tape is more 
pronounced than the positive influence of union commitment.  At first glance, these findings 
seem to suggest that unionization is harmful to employee perceptions of the work climate.  
However, it is important to note that these data do not account for the interdependencies between 
union member characteristics and union socialization experiences.  In fact, the findings may 
illustrate the importance of union members‟ individual characteristics as a moderating variable 
between union socialization and perceptions of red tape.  As suggested by Newton and Shore 
(1992), understanding the relationship between union socialization and the degree to which 
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members perceive union goals as beneficial could further explain the negative relationship 
between union socialization and perceived red tape.   
Lastly, no control variables significantly influenced perceptions of red tape.  This is 
interesting given previous red tape research suggesting that professionalization and social 
position in the organization should influence perceptions of red tape (Brewer & Walker, 2010a; 
Walker & Brewer, 2008).  For these union members, the social influence of unions may trump 
the effects of other social structures on perceptions of bureaucratic red tape.  These results should 
be interpreted with caution, however, for two reasons.  First, although the quantitative data 
collection was designed specifically to tap perceptions from individuals throughout the 
hierarchy, it examines perceptions in a single organization.  Broader research should assess these 
findings to additional contexts.  Second, this research uses education as a proxy of 
professionalism and management duties as a proxy for social position.  More research should 
seek to assess if these findings hold with more intricate measures of professionalism and social 
position in organization.  Even with these limitations, however, it is important to note that public 
employees concomitantly belong to several work related social groups, and the effects of some 
social structures may be more pronounced than others.   
Summary and Conclusion 
Given that a significant portion of public administration scholarship examines the 
contextual variables that complicate managing employees in the public sector, it should not be 
surprising that many studies portray unions as a contributor to an underperforming public 
workforce (J. D. Donahue, 2008; Moe, 2009).  Perhaps, as Moe (2006) illustrates, this assertion 
stems from the observation that union members are beyond the control of their organizational 
superiors.  What these studies neglect, however, is an in depth analysis of the potentially positive 
50 
beliefs and attitudes tied to unionization that could enhance organizational efficiency and 
effectiveness.  The purpose of this chapter was to fill this gap by empirically testing the 
relationships between union socialization, commitment to union values, and perceptions of 
bureaucratic red tape.  I argued that unionization influences perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, 
because unions strongly value employee rights that are protected by formal rules and procedures 
established in the labor contract.   
The findings I present here suggest that while casual union members view public 
organizations as bound in red tape, those individuals who internalize and accept union values are 
more likely to view work rules favorably.  As such, unions may encourage voluntary rule 
compliance, which, in turn, is more efficient for the organization compared to forced compliance 
(DeHart-Davis, 2009b; Tyler, 2006).  Based on these findings, future public sector research 
should not assume that eliminating labor unions would enhance public organizational 
performance.  In fact, limits on collective negotiations could diminish organizational efficiency 
and effectiveness by decreasing commitment to organizational rules.    The following chapter 
continues to examine the potentially positive effects of unions on members by investigating the 
relationship between unionization and public service motivation.     
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Illustrations 
Figure 3.1: SEM Standardized Parameter Estimates (Unionization and Red Tape) 
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Table 3.1: Regression Parameter Significance Levels (Unionization and Red Tape) 
Model df   p
Full Model 190 N/A N/A N/A
Trimmed Model
     Union Socialization 191 7.329 1 0.007
     Union Commitment 191 6.312 1 0.012
df
2
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Table 3.2: Standardized Regression Parameters for Control Variables (Red Tape) 
b SE t p
Fire Fighter -0.152 0.428 -0.354 0.723
Police Officer 0.336 0.351 0.959 0.338
College Degree 0.145 0.345 0.420 0.675
Female -0.347 0.339 -1.023 0.306
White 0.762 0.473 1.612 0.107
Management -0.475 0.405 -1.173 0.241  
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Chapter 4  
Unionization and Employee Motives: How Union Membership Shapes Public Service 
Motivation 
 Another area of public organizational behavior potentially influenced by unionization is 
the motivation of public employees.  The existing scholarly literature on unionization and public 
employee motivation is implicit and largely indirect, occurring primarily through an emphasis on 
the civil service protections advocated by unions. These protections are construed as reducing 
motivation for employees to work in an organizationally desirable manner. For example, the 
elaborate civil service protections advocated by unions have been cited for limiting the 
effectiveness of disciplinary actions for poor performing employees (Behn, 1995; Rainey, 2003). 
Unions have been construed as “steadfast supporters of the multiple protections now offered by 
the civil service” that have “vociferously opposed the performance focus and the move away 
from traditional processes and procedures” (p. 489). Unionization has also been seen as creating 
a “safe harbor” for public sector employees, that guarantees job security and undermines 
employee motivation because employees face little threat of discipline or termination (J. D. 
Donahue, 2008). 
 This chapter presents research on unionization and public employee motivation that 
differs in three ways from previous scholarship on unions and motivation.  First, it transcends the 
middle range theories typically associated with human resources management to explore unions 
as social institutions that shape member values.  Second, the chapter empirically tests the claim 
that union membership dampens employee motivation, an approach employed by only a handful 
of other studies (Bok & Dunlop, 1970).  Finally, the chapter examines for the first time the link 
between public unions and a form of motivation distinct to public service institutions and 
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organizations, public service motivation.  Looking at union motives and values through the lens 
of PSM expands the limited understanding of social institutions that give rise to publicly oriented 
motives. 
The concept of public service motivation (PSM) emerged in 1990 (Perry & Wise, 1990), 
and scholars have made substantial progress in understanding the psychological states that give 
rise to PSM as well as PSM‟s behavioral consequences (Alonso & Lewis, 2001; Houston, 2000, 
2006, 2008; Moynihan & Pandey, 2007; Pandey & Moynihan, 2006; Pandey & Stazyk, 2008; 
Perry, 1997; Wright, 2007).  Relatively little research exists, however, on how specific social 
institutions impact PSM (DeHart-Davis, et al., 2006; Moynihan & Pandey, 2007; Perry, 1997).    
Unionization may influence PSM because many studies imply that, by communicating 
individualistic values that contradict broader public values, unions encourage members to 
suppress the publicly oriented motives tied to PSM (J. D. Donahue, 2008; Moe, 2009; Riccucci, 
1987, 1988, 1990).  For example, unions often oppose personnel policies such as equal 
opportunity employment and affirmative action that are strongly tied to compassionate values.  
On the other hand, as Newton and Shore (1992) point out, when members internalize union 
values they likely apply self-imposed pressure to display attitudes that accord with union 
expectations.  Commitment to union values, in turn, is likely to elicit attitudes and behaviors that 
advance the collective good, as defined by the union (Newton & Shore, 1992).   
 Given the potential for commitment to union values to contradict PSM, this chapter 
explores the impact of commitment to union values on public service motivation by drawing 
from organizational psychology, public human resources management, and PSM theory.  First, I 
connect the literature on labor relations and public service motivation to construct four 
hypotheses exploring the nature of the relationships between commitment to union values and 
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each component element of PSM.  Second, I empirically test the hypotheses by analyzing 
qualitative data generated from several semi-structured interviews conducted in two municipal 
governments, and quantitative data based on a questionnaire distributed to over 300 municipal 
union members.  Third, I will discuss the findings presented in the chapter.  Finally, I will 
conclude with a summary of the theoretical arguments I make, and a statement on the 
relationship between union commitment and PSM.   
Commitment to Union Values and Public Service Motivation 
Research on union commitment originated with the work of Gordon and colleagues 
(Gordon, et al., 1980).  Commitment to the union specifically involves both a belief in the goals 
of the union, as well as congruence between union and member values (Gordon, et al., 1980; 
Newton & Shore, 1992; Porter & Smith, 1970).  Since the pioneering work of Gordon et al. 
(1980) numerous studies have outlined the behavioral and attitudinal consequences of union 
commitment.  Those members who are more committed to union values are more likely to 
participate in union activities (Gordon, et al., 1980), file grievances (Fullagar & Barling, 1989), 
and strike (Barling, Fullagar, Kelloway, & McElvie, 1992).  In addition to observable behaviors, 
union commitment also shapes member attitudes toward the industrial relations climate 
(Klandermans, 1989), political action and political candidates (Chandler & Gely, 1995, 1996; 
Fields, Masters, & Thacker, 1987; Moe, 2006), and turnover intentions (Barling, Fullagar, & 
Kelloway, 1992).   
Commitment to union values, however, varies substantially between union members, 
ranging from member alienation to complete acceptance of union values (Newton & Shore, 
1992).  Although labor unions represent a source of member values within municipal 
government, research has yet to investigate the psychological effects of potentially contradictory 
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union and public values on members of public labor organizations.  Because unions emphasize 
individualistic values, such as protection of individual rights and member solidarity, commitment 
to union values may undermine publicly oriented member motives.  The reduction in publicly 
oriented member motives occurs because the individualistic values associated with union 
membership may contradict emotions and values such as benevolence, self-sacrifice, compassion 
and social equity.  Alternatively, commitment to union values may to elicit attitudes and 
emotions (e.g. loyalty and selflessness) that encourage behaviors that advance the collective 
good of the union (Newton & Shore, 1992).   
Public management research on motives to serve the public took shape in 1990 with the 
conceptual development of public service motivation (Perry & Wise, 1990).  Perry and Wise 
defined PSM as “an individual‟s predisposition to respond to motives grounded uniquely in 
public service institutions and organizations” (Perry and Wise, 1990, p. 368).  In line with 
previous motivation research, PSM was operationalized as a higher order construct with four 
component dimensions across three categories of motives (Perry, 1996).
1
  Rational motives 
correspond with one‟s attraction to the policy making process, affective motives relate to 
compassion, and norm based motives correspond with both self-sacrifice and commitment to the 
public interest.  Recent trends in PSM theory, however, have broadened the term.  Today PSM 
refers to more than an individual‟s aspiration to work for government.  Rather PSM describes an 
individual‟s desire to serve the public good, sacrifice for the benefit of others, and promote the 
                                                 
1
 Although psychometric studies support three of four subdimensions -  commitment to public interest, compassion, 
and self-sacrifice (Coursey, et al., 2008),  this chapter examines all four of Perry‟s (1996) original sub-dimensions.   
Additionally, due to direct interest on the impact of labor unions on an individual‟s predilection toward the policy 
making process, I analyze each component dimension independently. 
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well-being of the collectivity (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008b). As such, PSM is closely related to 
other constructs such as the service ethic, public service ethos, altruism, and prosocial behavior 
(Perry & Hondeghem, 2008b; Rainey, 2003).   
Although a significant amount of empirical research examines the positive behaviors that 
result from high PSM levels (Brewer, 2003; Brewer & Selden, 1998; Houston, 2000, 2006, 2008; 
Kim, 2005), some scholars have called for increased attention to the institutional foundations of 
PSM (Perry, 1997, 2000; Perry & Vandenabeele, 2008).  As Perry and Vandenabeele (2008) 
point out, “Institutions can be understood as social structures infused with values and rules.  
These values and rules are embedded across societies in religion, family, and other social 
structures (p. 58).  However, Perry and Vandenabeele (2008) also acknowledge that intuitions 
will influence members‟ PSM differently depending on the degree to which individuals are 
committed to the institutional identity.  Because public service motivation originates from 
institutional values, social structures, such as labor unions, possess the capacity to shape 
members‟ predispositions to respond to public service motives.  Union member PSM levels, 
however, likely differ based on the degree to which they are committed to union values.  The 
following sections explore the relationship between member commitment to union values and the 
categories of motives associated with PSM. 
Union Commitment and Attraction to Policy Making.  The initial description of PSM 
suggests that civil servants are often drawn to the policy making process to influence policies 
they personally value or advocate for the interests of groups with which they identify (Perry & 
Wise, 1990).  Collective bargaining, the human resources management system favored by 
unions, is designed to protect employee rights from arbitrary personnel decisions of managers 
(Klingner, et al., 2010).  Unions frequently interact in political settings to shape public policies 
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that affect employee rights, such as legislation designed to limit collective bargaining (Barling, 
Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992; Kearney, 2010).  In fact, empirical research illustrates that unions 
are successful in electing candidates that support their contract positions (Moe, 2006). 
While some scholars argue that “public sector unions … can influence employer behavior 
through the political process” (Freeman, 1986, p. 42), union‟s attraction to policy making may 
not be limited to electoral activity (Chandler & Gely, 1996).
2
  In fact, the political activity of 
unions occurs primarily through two mechanisms.  Chandler and Gely (1996) point out that 
electoral politics involves voting for candidates that support union positions, but legislative 
politics involves lobbying already elected legislators to influence appointed administrators.   
Although unions are active in politics, the factors that shape member perceptions toward 
political activity are relatively unexplored in the literature.  Research suggests that commitment 
to union values influences perceptions toward both electoral activity and political advocacy 
(Fields, et al., 1987; Thacker, Fields, & Barclay, 1990).  For example, Fields, Masters, and 
Thacker (1987) suggest that a large group of union members oppose the political activities of 
unions, but show that those members who are more committed to the union tend to support the 
political activities of the labor organization.  Later research by Thacker and colleagues 
corroborated this finding (Thacker, et al., 1990).  Based on evidence suggesting that non-
committed union members may be skeptical of union political activity (Kochan, 1979), but that 
committed members strongly support the political positions of the union I hypothesize that: 
                                                 
2
 Chandler and Gely illustrate that form of government significantly influences the form of union political activity.  
Because appointed officials cannot be influenced via electoral mechanisms, unions seek to advance contract 
positions by persuading legislators to limit managerial discretion over personnel processes.  This type of activity is 
more prevalent in city manager forms of government.   
60 
 
H1: Union members who are more committed to union values will be more attracted to 
the policy making process. 
 
Union Commitment and Compassion.  The second dimension of public service 
motivation stems from an individual‟s compassionate motives.  In their initial theoretical 
explanation Perry and Wise (1990) suggest that the compassion dimension of PSM involves a 
combination of values, perhaps the most crucial of which is benevolence.  Citing Frederickson 
and Hart (1985), Perry and Wise indicate that the “patriotism of benevolence” is an integral 
component of the compassion dimension, which includes “an extensive love of all people within 
our political boundaries and the imperative that they must be protected in all of the basic rights 
granted to them by the enabling documents” (Frederickson and Hart, 1985 cited in Perry and 
Wise, 1990, p. 369, emphasis added).  As Klingner, Nalbandian, and Llorens (2010) point out, 
public personnel management involves balancing four conflicting value sets, political 
responsiveness, efficiency, social equity, and employee rights.  Collective bargaining, the human 
resources management practice associated with labor unions, is bound to PSM‟s compassion 
dimension because it explicitly emphasizes protecting individual rights as the fundamental value.   
Collective bargaining contracts are designed to protect the rights of employees by 
establishing regulations that specify the terms of employment and limit the ability of mangers to 
make arbitrary personnel decisions (A. K. Donahue, et al., 2000; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; 
Gallagher, 1983; Klingner, et al., 2010).  In fact, some of the basic functions of unions include 
affording workers the opportunity to participate in workplace decisions, preventing manipulation 
and exploitation of the working class, and fostering democracy in societies that champion it as a 
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fundamental value (Hochner, Koziara, & Schmidt, 1980; Sinyai, 2006).  The degree to which 
union members display higher levels of compassion, however, depends on the degree to which 
they view their values as congruent with the union‟s values.   
Some empirical findings support the claim that committed union members should display 
higher levels of compassion.  For example, Marxist work beliefs significantly influence attitudes 
toward unionization (Barling, et al., 1991; Buchholz, 1978).  As Barling et al. (1991) point out, 
due to their Marxist belief systems, unions “assert that workers should have a greater span of 
control over the workplace as a means of avoiding exploitation and alienation” (p. 726).   
Although these findings run contrary to some public management studies suggesting that union 
members are less compassionate, perhaps even discriminatory (Riccucci, 1987, 1988, 1990), I 
expect that:  
   
H2: Union members who are more committed to union values will be more 
compassionate. 
 
Union Commitment and Commitment to the Public Interest/Self-Sacrifice.  The final two 
dimensions of PSM fall under the category of norm based motives.
3
  In the initial assessment of 
PSM, Perry and Wise (1990) argue that values such as nationalism, loyalty to country, serving 
the public interest, and altruism provide the normative pillar of PSM.  Recent work further 
emphasizes these values in an attempt to theoretically establish PSM as an alternative to theories 
                                                 
3
 Although commitment to the public interest and self-sacrifice are presumed to be two distinct dimensions of public 
service motivation, empirical research suggests that they are highly correlated (Perry, 1996).  As such, I examine the 
commitment to the public interest and self-sacrifice dimensions together. 
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of rational choice and self-interest (Perry & Vandenabeele, 2008).  Union commitment is closely 
related to the normative motives of PSM because it stems from feelings of responsibility, loyalty, 
and selflessness with respect to the labor organization (Gordon, et al., 1980; Kelloway, et al., 
1992).   
Due to their emphasis on individual rights, much public management research on unions 
begins with assumptions of member self-interest (Moe, 2006, 2009).  The individualistic values 
harbored by unions incorporate the protection of employee rights and member solidarity 
(Klingner, et al., 2010), which can lead to feelings of loyalty toward the union.  In fact, strong 
commitment to these union values can lead to acts that union members view as advancing the 
collective good as opposed to self-interested (Newton & Shore, 1992).  Some public 
management studies also suggest that union members in the public sector often act in ways that 
contradict assumptions of self-interest (DiIulio, 1994).  For example, in his study of culture at the 
bureau of prisons, DiIulio (1994) illustrates that unionized prison guards displayed extraordinary 
acts of selflessness, during the Atlanta prison riots.   Because internalization of union values 
causes some union members act selflessly, the degree to which members internalize values varies 
significantly (Newton & Shore, 1992).  Based on evidence suggesting that norm-based motives 
vary across unions and members, but that commitment to union values elicits acts designed to 
benefit others, I expect that: 
 
H3: Union members who are more committed to union values will be more committed to 
the public interest. 
and: 
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H4: Union members who are more committed to union values will be more self-
sacrificing. 
 
Model Controls.  Although this chapter focuses on the relationship between commitment 
to union values and the component dimensions of public service motivation there are three sets 
of alternatives that could suppress the relationship between commitment to union values and 
PSM.  First, research suggests that union socialization significantly influences both union 
commitment (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992) and the dimensions of public service 
motivation (Davis, 2010).  As such, I include a construct in the model designed to tap union 
socialization.  Second, several individual characteristics play a role in union commitment and 
PSM.  Demographic categories such as age, tenure, education, gender, and race all influence 
union commitment (Angle & Perry, 1981; Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992).
4
  Likewise, 
three of these demographic categories – race, gender, and education – significantly influence 
public service motivation (DeHart-Davis, et al., 2006; Pandey & Stazyk, 2008; Perry, 1997).
5
  I 
include these variables as covariates of both union commitment and the component dimensions 
of PSM.  Finally, not all unions display similar motives and attitudes (Visser, 2006).  Because 
they are the most heavily unionized areas of municipal government, I also included two variables 
to control for membership in police and fire unions.  The following section presents qualitative 
                                                 
4
 For the purposes of this analysis I control for age, but do not have information on employee tenure.  Although this 
is a limitation of the analysis it is reasonable to expect that age and tenure would be highly correlated.  As such, it 
may not be necessary to include both measures. 
5
 Several PSM studies illustrate the positive influence of professionalism on PSM (see Pandey and Stazyk, 2008 for 
a comprehensive review).  I employ the education variable here as a proxy for professional status. 
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findings that suggest that the union context influences PSM, as well as statistical tests of each 
research hypothesis.    
Findings 
Analysis of Qualitative Data.  Prior to statistically analyzing the influence of member 
commitment to union values on PSM, I sought to determine if the union context meaningfully 
shapes publicly oriented motives by examining employee perspectives gathered through several 
semi-structured interviews.  More than 100 randomly selected employees, both unionized and 
non-unionized, from two municipal organizations in Kansas offered perspectives on the motives 
attached to union membership.  Because this chapter explores potential linkages between the 
union context and member motives, I examine 40 interviews that freely commented on motives 
in the context of public sector unions.  The qualitative analysis is limited to only those interviews 
provided by public sector union members. 
In accordance with the argument that the union context shapes public service motivation, 
union members tend to view the union as source of publicly oriented motives.  For example, 
many union members tend to emphasize the union as an outlet to participate directly in 
municipal politics.  To illustrate, one member of the American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) pointed out that “[some] unions are very strong, and have a lot 
of political clout. … They can swing commission votes because of their numbers”.  Another 
union member, who was also vice president of a Kansas public employees union, indicated that 
when “one of new council members [was] elected” the “union had meet and greet with him.”   
The union questioned whether new officials would support ordinances that would make 
employment regulations more transparent.  The union members interviewed tended perceive the 
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union as an important mechanism to influence politics, but also tend to view union political 
activity as complimentary to collective bargaining positions.     
Although many unionized employees view the union as an outlet for political activity, 
some members perceive the interchange between elected officials and city employees as 
undesirable under some circumstances.  This is particularly the case when elected officials 
attempt to structure the nature of work.  When discussing municipal politics in the context of his 
unionized position, one water department employee communicated this point by saying, 
 
“I dislike the political aspects, which are heavy in this city … even though I‟m unionized.  
… We have nine council members and at any given moment, they can and go pick up the 
phone and say „I want this done.‟  That‟s not their function, but I‟m smart enough to 
know that‟s how the real world works.  In an ideal world, the city manager should be 
directing the workforce. Council should set policies and procedures and let [workers] put 
them in place.” 
 
This perspective was echoed by a firefighter who said, “I don‟t like dealing with politics.  I 
would much rather be there for the people that I work for, [as opposed to] having some [council 
member] buddy downtown tell me how things should be run.”  For these members, political 
activity is an important component of unionization, but elected officials should not overstep their 
authority by directing the nature of work.   
 The perspective that unionization tends to increase feelings of compassion for other 
members also seems to ring true with public union members.  In fact, some unionized employees 
emphasize the interdependencies between union members, particularly when the overall quality 
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of work life is at stake.  One female police officer clearly articulated her perspective on feelings 
of compassion, connectedness, and dependency with other members of the Fraternal Order of 
Police (FOP) by saying, 
 
“The majority of police officers are [FOP] members but it‟s not mandatory. Whatever the 
union fights for becomes your benefit. You can ask to be released from the union, but it‟s 
not very practical. …  If I dropped out the union, some attitudes would change towards 
me because [union membership] is an all-for-one and one-for-all type [of] thing. I 
wouldn‟t want to get out of the union.” 
 
Increased feelings of compassion and connectedness toward fellow union members 
extend to other public sector unions as well, but feelings of connectedness are often tied to 
paying dues.  For example, the vice president of the public employee union cited earlier 
suggested that paying dues is important for receiving adequate representation, but even those 
who don‟t pay dues will receive representation if their grievance adversely affects all union 
members.  The vice president said specifically,  
 
“By law, as an elected union official, I have to represent you in your grievance. But you 
get what you pay for.  If you‟re not paying [dues], you‟re not getting the greatest 
representation. But if your case involves something against the contract, yes, I will fight 
it, because it‟s hurting me and others.”    
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One firefighter corroborated this assertion by pointing out that those firefighters who choose not 
to pay union dues are often ostracized by other unionized firefighters, and an FOP member even 
suggested that while representation by the union is a major benefit of membership the social 
interactions are equally important.  He stated that,  
 
“Membership in the police union is voluntarily, not automatic. Your dues cover legal 
fees, representatives for grievance issues, contract negotiation, and a death benefit. It‟s a 
buddy system. It‟s beneficial, I would never dream of not being in union.”    
 
While these findings suggest that the union context influences compassionate motives, feelings 
of interdependency and connectedness are often tied to paying dues in an effort to enhance the 
quality of work life.  
While union member commitment to the public interest and self-sacrifice could be 
inferred from the above statements, explicit comments from public sector union members on the 
link between unionization and commitment to the public interest/self-sacrifice were much less 
common.  However, the stories provided by some public union members support the argument 
that public unionization is qualitatively distinct from private sector unionization.  The Kansas 
public employee union vice president, who was an outspoken advocate of union protections, 
suggested that increased commitment to the public interest was a unique component of public 
unionization.  He specifically argued that, “public sector unions are more for the people, the 
citizenry, than your corporate union types are.”   The unionized water department employee cited 
above also recognized the relationship between public unionism and public service.  He pointed 
out that the union “has afforded me other opportunities,” and that he enjoyed “helping people 
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and being public servant.”  He also expressed significant “satisfaction in delivering a quality 
service, such as when people turn their faucets on and get high- quality water.”  The perceptions 
of these individuals suggest that the public sector union context is unique when contrasted to 
private sector unions.   
Whereas public union members tended to attach compassion to other dues paying 
members, these interview respondents appear to suggest that public union members anchor 
commitment to the public interest and self-sacrifice in terms of the broader population served by 
government.
6
  In fact, one firefighter described how he came to understand his role as a public 
servant after he joined the department.  He state that, “I was more for, myself and my family 
before [I joined the fire department], and now I‟m out to [do] whatever the public needs us to 
do.”  When asked if he belonged to the fire union he responded, “Yeah.  I do it because of all the 
department‟s across the country that I visit you know how they treat you being a union member.”  
While this member attached significance to public service, he was not extremely attached to the 
values of the union.  His perspective partially contradicts the views of others because he did not 
explicitly link the intrinsic value of public service to unionism.   
While these perspectives cannot be considered representative of all public union 
members, they do illustrate that many members perceive the union as a source of publicly 
oriented motives.  These examples illustrate that many union members view the union context as 
important for shaping publicly oriented motives, but there is variation in the perspectives of 
                                                 
6
 An extensive examination of the qualitative data did not reveal any instances where union members explicitly state 
they were willing to sacrifice personally for the benefit of the union.  However, many members implied that they 
were willing to do so.  Rather than impose meaning on respondent statements I more thoroughly examine union 
member self sacrifice in the quantitative analysis. 
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unionized employees. The next section complements the qualitative analysis by conducting 
statistical tests of the above stated hypotheses to determine the nature of the relationship between 
commitment to union values and public service motivation.   
Analysis of Quantitative Data.  There are some important points to discuss in terms of 
model specification before delving into the findings.  First, just as in the previous chapter, there 
are only two indicators for the union socialization construct, so the factor loadings are 
constrained to equality for model identification purposes.  Second, also like the previous chapter, 
I model union commitment as a second order construct to comport with previous research 
(Kelloway, et al., 1992).  Finally, public service motivation researchers have expressed some 
degree of concern regarding the relationships between the attraction to policy making sub-scale 
and the other dimensions of public service motivation.
7
  As Perry (1996) points out, the concern 
with the attraction to policy making subscale stems from its composition “entirely of negatively 
worded items” so “it confounds whether the subscale taps the attraction to policy making 
dimension…” (p. 20).  Although not depicted in the diagram, I loaded each negatively worded 
PSM item on a separate construct.
8
  This is designed to separate the shared variance in the 
attraction to policy making items due to negative wording from the variance shared due to the 
                                                 
7
 In fact, some PSM researchers have excluded the attraction to policy making dimension from attempts to validate 
construct measurement (Coursey, et al., 2008).  I include the attraction to policy making dimension here for two 
reasons.  First, a substantial number of research studies continues to validate union activity in the policy making 
process.  Second, public policy making, whether formal or informal, is an important component of public sector 
work environments, particularly for street-level workers (Lipsky, 1980).   
8
 The negative wording construct is defined by five items, all of which are negatively worded.  It includes the three 
attraction to policy making items and two other negatively worded items from the compassion sub-dimension. 
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attraction to policy making construct.  As such, the remaining variance more closely taps the true 
attraction to policy making construct. 
The findings drawn from the confirmatory factor model and structural equation model 
indicate that the overall model fits the data well.
9
  Some studies suggest that .08RMSEA , 
.90CFI  , and .90NNFI   indicate good fitting models (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993; Marsh, et 
al., 2004).  This model surpasses all three of those criteria.  The bidirectional (psi) paths between 
the PSM sub-dimensions can be interpreted as zero order correlations, whereas the unidirectional 
(beta) paths between union commitment and the PSM sub-dimensions can be interpreted as 
regression coefficients.
10
  On the other hand, the paths between union commitment and its 
component dimensions can be interpreted as factor loadings.  Table 4.1 presents the factor 
loadings associated with all manifest variables, and figure 4.1 presents the standardized 
parameter estimates and the overall model fit statistics for the SEM. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4.1] 
 
 [INSERT FIGURE 4.1] 
                                                 
9
 Although the overall model fits the data well, the factor loadings associated with the attraction to policy making 
construct are relatively poor.  This suggests that the concerns of many PSM researchers, beginning with Perry 
(1996), that the negative wording of the attraction to policy making items compromises the construct is partially 
true.  Even though the factor loadings are relatively low I proceed with the analysis to examine, as best as possible, 
the effects of union membership on attraction to the policy making process. 
10
 Because this chapter hypothesizes about the regression parameters between union commitment and PSM I did not 
include covariates in the diagram.  Many of the model controls were not significant, but were left in the model to 
rule out alternative explanations.  Table 4 provides the estimates related to model controls.   
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All four of the hypothesized relationships significantly contribute to the model.  I tested 
each of the beta paths for significance using the 
2 difference test option for categorical 
variables in Mplus.  The table illustrates the change in model fit when the beta paths between 
union commitment and each dimension of PSM were constrained to zero.  Due to the use of 
categorical variables the difference test is not distributed as a 
2 value.  The 2 column 
provides an accurate depiction of overall change in model fit.    The results of 
2 difference 
testing indicate that constraining the latent regression parameters between union commitment 
and the four component dimensions of PSM to zero would cause a significant decrease in model 
fit.    Table 4.2 illustrates changes in model fit and associated significance levels in the event that 
a regression parameter was constrained to zero.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 4.2] 
 
The results presented in figure 4.1 illustrate the nature of relationships between union 
commitment and each sub-dimension of PSM.  Employees reporting a greater degree of 
commitment to union values also report higher levels of all four component dimensions of PSM.  
Additionally, the relationships between commitment to union values and PSM are all in the 
hypothesized direction,   Unlike traditional regression models, which calculate one 2R value to 
indicate variance explained in a single dependent variable, there are multiple 2R values in 
structural models that correspond to each dependent variable. The findings illustrate that the 
model explains 21.4% of the variance in attraction to policy making, 28.8% of the variance in 
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compassion, 21.6% of the variance in commitment to the public interest, and 13.0% of the 
variance in self-sacrifice. 
Finally, the model controls reveal a few significant relationships between 
sociodemographic categories and the component dimensions of PSM.  First, differences between 
unions account for some variation in the elements of PSM.
11
  Firefighters report less attraction to 
the policy making process, less compassion, greater commitment to the public interest, and more 
self-sacrifice.
12
  Police officers report significantly less attraction to the policy making process 
and compassion and self-sacrifice, but they do not differ from others in terms of commitment to 
the public interest.  Second, employees with bachelor‟s degrees report higher levels of 
commitment to the public interest, but do not differ significantly from non-college educated 
employees with respect to any other dimension of PSM.  Finally, female employees report 
significantly greater compassion, more commitment to the public interest, and higher degrees of 
self-sacrifice, while white respondents do not differ significantly from non-white respondents 
with respect to any dimension of PSM.  Table 4.3 provides the parameter estimates and 
associated significance levels for the relationships between PSM and all control variables.    
 
[INSERT TABLE 4.3] 
 
                                                 
11
 To assess the effects of different unions I included two dummy variables that control for membership in fire 
unions and police unions.  It is critical to control for police and fire unions because they represent the most heavily 
unionized departments in the municipal governments examined here. 
12
 For the purposes of model controls I interpret the effects if the relationship between the control variable and 
associated PSM dimension significant at the .10 level or greater. 
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Discussion 
 In public management and administration literature scholars have implicitly argued that 
unions, by emphasizing the protection of individualistic values through civil service regulations, 
can diminish employee motivation (Behn, 1995; J. D. Donahue, 2008).  This implicit 
assumption, however, has received limited empirical attention (Bok & Dunlop, 1970), and even 
less attention has been paid to the effects of unions on a form of motivation unique to public 
institutions and organizations, public service motivation (PSM).  By conceptualizing unions as 
social institutions that influence member values, this chapter sought to answer calls to examine 
the institutional foundations of publicly oriented motives (Perry, 2000; Perry & Vandenabeele, 
2008).  I argued specifically that the values harbored by labor unions accord with broader 
publicly oriented values.  As such, when union members internalize union values they are likely 
to display higher levels of PSM. 
 The labor relations scholarship in public management, as well as other disciplines, points 
out that protection of employee and individual rights constitutes the fundamental value 
associated with unions and collective bargaining (Gordon & Lee, 1990; Klingner, et al., 2010).  
When members internalize union values, they tend to exhibit feelings of loyalty, responsibility, 
and connectedness toward the labor organization (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992; Gordon, 
et al., 1980; Kelloway, et al., 1992).  When viewed this way, member internalization of union 
values encourages feelings of compassion, benevolence, and selflessness associated with PSM 
within the union‟s boundaries.  Although the findings suggest that union members display higher 
PSM, the degree to which these attitudes and emotions extend to others outside the union‟s 
boundaries remains unclear.  As Perry and Vandenabeele (2008) point out, an individual‟s 
identity links social institutions and motives, in this case union membership provides a forum for 
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members to realize a specific identity.  While findings I present here contradict the implicit 
assumptions that unionization dampens public service motivation for fellow union members, I 
cannot assess the degree to which publicly oriented motives extend beyond institutional 
boundaries.  In fact, it is possible that higher PSM toward union members could create an “us 
versus them” mentality, thereby dampening PSM with respect to other social groups.  
Additionally, I argue that committed union members can view the employment protections 
associated with civil service regulations as complementary to, and necessary for, expressing the 
attitudes, behaviors, and emotions associated with public service motivation.   
 The qualitative and quantitative evidence reported here illustrates that unions serve as a 
social institution that influence members‟ publicly oriented motives by transmitting the value of 
employee rights.  The qualitative findings I present do not formally test the research hypotheses, 
but rather they suggest that the union context influences member motives.  In particular they 
provide two important insights that contribute to better understanding the origins of public 
service motivation.  First, the qualitative evidence supports the expanded theoretical argument of 
Perry and Vandenabeele (2008), which argues that PSM has institutional foundations.  In this 
case, the narratives provided by municipal union members suggest that the institutional values of 
unionism causes individuals harbor the attitudes, beliefs, and values that give rise to public 
service motivation.  In particular, some of these union members perceive public unions as 
distinct from private unions.  Public union members tend to view public unions, and the 
protections they offer employees, as a primary avenue to promote the public interest, whereas 
private sector unions are based on foundations of self-interest.     
 Second, while the qualitative findings support the institutional argument that unions, as 
social structures, influence member motives, they also suggest that some dimensions of PSM 
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may be best evaluated with reference to specific social groups.  In the examples of union 
perspectives provided in this chapter, union members tended to anchor feelings of compassion to 
other dues paying union members.  The stories provided by the police officer and firefighter 
provided above suggest that dues paying members exhibit a “one-for-all and all-for-one” attitude 
that is closely tied the feelings of interdependency associated with PSM‟s compassion 
dimension.  While these stories imply self-sacrifice with respect to the union, no member 
specifically referenced instances where they personally sacrificed their interests for the benefit of 
the union.  Alternatively, the union members interviewed were inclined to conceptualize 
commitment to the public interest and self-sacrifice in terms of the broader population served by 
government.  In fact, the story of one firefighter suggested that he did not fully realize his 
commitment to the public interest until he joined municipal government. 
 While the qualitative results suggested that the public sector union context may influence 
public service motivation, they cannot provide evidence illustrating the nature of the 
relationships between commitment to union values and PSM.  The statistical results I present, 
however, suggest that public sector unionism serves as a mechanism for communicating to 
members institutional values, attitudes, and beliefs that enhance public service motivation.  The 
model fit indices presented in figure 4.1 illustrate that the theoretical model is an accurate 
representation of population characteristics.  Furthermore, when controlling for a few commonly 
acknowledged sources of PSM (e.g. gender, professionalism, and union socialization) the model 
explains relatively large proportions of variance in the component dimensions of PSM.  The 
model explains 21.4% of the variance in attraction to policy making, 28.8% of the variance in 
compassion, 21.6% of the variance in commitment to the public interest, and 13.0% of the 
variance in self-sacrifice.  Additionally, the model results confirm the research hypotheses that 
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commitment to union values influences the motives that give rise to PSM, all four of which are 
in the direction expected. 
 The standardized regression parameters in figure 4.1 also provide a few additional 
insights into the relative importance of commitment to union values on the component 
dimensions of PSM.  First, commitment to union values most prominently affects union 
member‟s attraction to the policy making process.  This finding supports the vast literature that 
labor unions are, at their foundations, political organizations (Chandler & Gely, 1995, 1996; 
Delaney, Fiorito, & Jarley, 1999; Fields, et al., 1987; Kearney, 2010; Thacker, et al., 1990).  This 
chapter builds on those studies by illustrating that union political activity encourages members 
who adopt union values to be more attracted to the policy making process.  The second most 
pronounced influence of commitment to union values is on member compassion.  As such, this 
chapter provides evidence that the union value of employee rights protection translates into 
feelings of connectedness and dependency on other union members.  Finally, although weaker 
compared to other relationships, commitment to union values significantly affects the normative 
components of PSM (commitment to the public interest and self-sacrifice).  The findings I 
present here partially reject claims that unions are primarily self-interested organizations 
designed to protect members at the expense of clients (Moe, 2009).  Rather, many public union 
members view the protection of employee rights as fundamentally necessary for serving the 
public interest.   
 Some control variables also significantly predicted variation in the component 
dimensions of PSM.  First, the model results support the argument that PSM is a gendered 
construct, and that women should report higher scores on some elements of public service 
motivation (DeHart-Davis, et al., 2006).  In these data female respondents reported significantly 
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more compassion, commitment to the public interest, and self-sacrifice.  Second, this research 
partially supports the common argument that professionalism increases PSM (DeHart-Davis, et 
al., 2006; Moynihan & Pandey, 2007; Perry, 1997).  The findings I present here suggest that 
professionalism influences respondents‟ commitment to the public interest.  These findings, 
however, should be interpreted with caution because I use a proxy for professional socialization, 
education level.  Finally, the findings illustrate that police officers and fire fighters differ 
significantly from other members of the organization on many component elements of PSM.  
While unionized members of the fire department report lower levels of attraction to policy 
making and compassion, they report greater commitment to the public interest and self-sacrifice.  
Likewise, unionized police officers also report less attraction to the policy making process and 
compassion, but they also report less self-sacrifice.  Police officers do not differ from other 
employees in terms of commitment to the public interest.  These findings provide some evidence 
that organizational mission may shape overall motivation (Wright, 2007).  It may be that the 
unique missions of these departments, in addition to their heavily unionized status, influences 
PSM levels. 
Summary and Conclusion 
 Given that a significant amount of public management and administration literature 
assumes that public unions diminish member motivation (J. D. Donahue, 2008; Moe, 2009), and 
questions of employee motivation in the public sector are paramount (Behn, 1995; Rainey, 
2003), it is striking that few studies have sought to empirically examine claims that unionization 
undermines employee motivation.  It is possible that, as Behn (1995) points out, we can attribute 
the limited understanding of unions‟ motivational context in public management to an over 
reliance on economics as the underlying paradigm for understanding the behavior of public 
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employees.  While studies of unions based on economic theories contribute to understanding 
some elements of union member behavior, they neglect an in-depth analysis of the institutional 
and psychological factors that give rise to specific forms of motivation.  The purpose of this 
chapter was to fill this research gap in two ways.  First, I sought to advance the study of public 
sector unions by applying institutional theory, particularly as it relates to social psychology, to 
better understand public unions as social structures that define member attitudes, values, and 
beliefs.  Second, this chapter moves beyond implicit assumptions of the dampening effect of 
unions on motivation by empirically testing a model of public service motivation that 
incorporates member internalization of union values.  I argued that member internalization of the 
primary union value, protection of individual and employee rights, facilitates the publicly 
oriented motives that define PSM.   
The findings presented in this chapter suggest that committed union members are more 
attracted to the policy making process, compassionate, committed to the public interest, and self-
sacrificing.  Based on these findings future research cannot simply assume that public sector 
unions are solely self-interested organizations that diminish individual motivation and job 
performance.  In fact, by enhancing the component elements of public service motivation, unions 
may actually enhance some forms of organizational and individual performance (Brewer, 2008; 
Brewer & Selden, 2000; Kim, 2005; Naff & Crum, 1999).  Alternatively, placing strict limits on 
collective bargaining in the public sector may detrimentally influence public employee 
motivation and related job performance.  The following chapter draws together the empirical 
findings that member commitment to public sector union values diminishes perceptions of red 
tape and enhances public service motivation to hypothesize a theoretical model of the positive, 
but indirect, effects of public unionization on overall job satisfaction. 
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Illustrations 
Table 4.1: Standardized Factor Loadings 
 
Standardized Estimates
MEETINGS 0.846 0.716
UNIONINT 0.846 0.716
WWU1 0.977 0.950
WWU2 0.897 0.790
WWU3 0.940 0.871
LOY1 0.885 0.764
LOY2 0.856 0.713
LOY3 0.855 0.709
LOY4 0.901 0.795
LOY5 0.934 0.859
LOY6 0.867 0.728
RTU1 0.707 0.481
RTU2 0.872 0.742
RTU3 0.820 0.652
RTU4 0.799 0.616
APM1 (Reversed) 0.162 0.026
APM2 (Reversed) 0.366 0.134
APM3 (Reversed) 0.643 0.413
COM1 0.517 0.267
COM2 0.408 0.167
COM3 (Reversed) 0.646 0.417
COM4 (Reversed) 0.487 0.237
COM5 0.637 0.405
CPI1 0.663 0.405
CPI2 0.778 0.605
CPI3 0.811 0.658
SS1 0.602 0.363
SS2 0.750 0.562
SS3 0.603 0.364
SS4 0.454 0.206
Scale Items
Self-Sacrifice
Commitment to the Public Interest
Compassion
Attraction to Policy Making
Responsibility to the Union
Loyalty to the Union
Union Socialization
Willingness to Work for the Union
2R
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Table 4.1: Standardized Factor Loadings (Continued) 
Standardized Estimates
APM1 (Reversed) 0.783 0.613
APM2 (Reversed) 0.257 0.066
APM3 (Reversed) 0.687 0.472
COM3 (Reversed) -0.054 0.003
COM4 (Reversed) 0.293 0.086
Negative Wording
Scale Items 2R
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
Figure 4.1: SEM Standardized Parameter Estimates (Union Commitment and PSM) 
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Table 4.2: Regression Parameter Significance Levels (Union Commitment and PSM) 
df p
508 NA NA NA
Full Model
Commitment to Union Values
Attraction to Policy Making 509 10.128 1 0.002
Compassion 509 14.388 1 <0.001
Commitment to the Public Interest 509 7.525 1 0.006
Self-Sacrifice 509 8.944 1 0.003
Model
2 df
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Table 4.3: Standardized Regression Parameters for Control Variables (PSM) 
b SE EST/SE p
Union Socialization -0.506 0.283 -2.013 0.044
Fire Fighter -0.412 0.471 -2.658 0.008
Police Officer -0.229 0.302 -1.795 0.073
College Degree -0.014 0.235 -0.152 0.880
Female 0.140 0.275 1.259 0.208
White -0.153 0.327 -1.435 0.151
Union Socialization -0.587 0.214 -3.246 0.001
Fire Fighter -0.242 0.301 -2.573 0.010
Police Officer -0.438 0.243 -4.495 < 0.001
College Degree 0.021 0.288 0.291 0.771
Female 0.278 0.216 3.358 0.001
White -0.072 0.225 -1.032 0.302
Union Socialization -0.056 0.161 -0.392 0.695
Fire Fighter 0.143 0.229 1.896 0.058
Police Officer 0.001 0.167 0.021 0.983
College Degree 0.121 0.157 1.915 0.055
Female 0.165 0.163 2.511 0.012
White -0.063 0.175 -1.109 0.267
Union Socialization -0.136 0.140 -1.038 0.299
Fire Fighter 0.096 0.251 5.035 <0.001
Police Officer -0.080 0.168 3.362 0.001
College Degree 0.100 0.164 -0.658 0.510
Female 0.097 0.162 -1.924 0.054
White 0.056 0.178 -0.886 0.376
Self-Sacrifice
Attraction to Policy Making
Compassion
Commitment to the Public Interest
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Chapter 5  
Unionization and Job Satisfaction: How Union Membership Influences Public Sector Job 
Satisfaction 
 A final area of organizational behavior potentially influenced by unionization is 
employee job satisfaction.  The labor relations literature frequently argues that unions‟ 
representative political function within organizations, paradoxically, decreases member job 
satisfaction.  Perry and Angle (1979) describe collective bargaining as organizational politics in 
the sense that labor negotiators “manage influence to obtain non-sanctioned ends or … employ 
non-sanctioned means of influence” (p. 488).  They go on to argue that job satisfaction is one 
employee attitude, among many, influenced by the organizational politics of collective 
bargaining (Perry & Angle, 1979).  The organizational politics of collective bargaining has been 
cited as a primary source of union member job dissatisfaction because it unrealistically raises job 
expectations for higher wages and better working conditions, cues members to the less desirable 
aspects of work, and provides a forum for unionized employees to voice discontent,  (C. J. 
Berger, et al., 1983; Borjas, 1979; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Hammer & Avgar, 2005; Ross, 
1948).   
While this literature provides significant insights into the psychological effects of 
unionization on members, it has limited generalizability for union influence on public sector job 
satisfaction because it draws primarily from observations in the private sector.  Two aspects of 
the public sector work environment potentially limit the applicability of private sector union 
research on job satisfaction: higher levels of red tape and greater public service motivation 
among employees. With regards to red tape, research suggests (1) that public sector managers 
perceive higher red tape than private sector managers (Baldwin, 1990; Bozeman & Rainey, 
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1998; Rainey, 2003; Rainey, et al., 1995) and (2) that red tape is persistently and negatively 
correlated with job satisfaction (Baldwin, 1990; Buchanan, 1975; DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005; 
Lan & Rainey, 1992; Snizek & Bullard, 1983). Similarly, research (1) detects higher public 
service motivation among public, compared to private, employees (Crewson, 1997; Houston, 
2000, 2006, 2008) and (2) consistently correlates PSM with greater job satisfaction (Cerase & 
Farinell, 2006; Kim, 2005; Naff & Crum, 1999; Norris, 2003). Considering this scholarship in 
light of the evidence presented in previous chapters, that union commitment appears to lower 
perceptions of red tape and increase public service motivation, public sector union membership 
may indirectly increase member job satisfaction. 
In order to explore these complex indirect effects, this chapter devises and tests three 
hypotheses based on two areas of scholarship
1
. The first hypothesis, that unionization directly 
decreases job satisfaction, is based on literature suggesting that the organizational politics of 
collective bargaining provides members an avenue to voice dissatisfaction (Perry & Angle, 
1979).  The second hypothesis, that union commitment indirectly increases job satisfaction by 
lowering perceived red tape, is based on theory suggesting that organizational limits on 
employee autonomy reduce job satisfaction (Hackman & Oldham, 1976), and red tape limits 
employee autonomy (DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005; Pandey, et al., 2007).  The third 
hypothesis, that union commitment increases job satisfaction by increasing PSM, stems from 
                                                 
1
 Unfortunately there is no unifying theoretical framework to the author‟s knowledge from which to draw that guides 
the development of research hypotheses regarding the direct and indirect link between union commitment and job 
satisfactions.  As such, I draw from research in multiple disciplines, but findings across disciplines are inconsistent 
in terms of specifying the directional relationship between unionization and job satisfaction.  This ambiguity 
complicates specifying the direction of hypothetical relationships in this study. 
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theory suggesting that individuals with high PSM are more satisfied with work in the public 
sector (Perry & Wise, 1990; Rainey, 1982) because it affords the opportunity to sacrifice for 
others (Le Grand, 2003). All hypotheses are tested using quantitative data collected from over 
300 public sector union members in a large Kansas municipality.
2
  
Commitment to Union Values and Job Satisfaction in the Public Sector 
Union Commitment and Job Satisfaction.  Locke (1976) described job satisfaction as the 
“pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one‟s job or job 
experience” (p. 1300).  Although several factors influence job satisfaction, Wright and Davis 
(2003) point toward two components of the overall work environment that influence public 
sector job satisfaction.  First, organizational characteristics, or the work context, influence job 
satisfaction by shaping the way employees interact with the work organization.  The work 
context affects overall job satisfaction by affording employees greater autonomy at work, 
thereby increasing the degree to which individuals perceive work outcomes as a direct result of 
their effort (Hackman & Oldham, 1976).  Second, job characteristics, defined as “the collection 
of tasks that comprise the job” (Perry & Porter, 1982), includes the degree to which the job 
positively influences others (Hackman & Oldham, 1976).  Jobs that positively influence the lives 
of others encourage workers to perceive work as more meaningful, which contributes to higher 
overall job satisfaction (Hackman & Oldham, 1976).   
                                                 
2
 While previous chapters examined qualitative data from union members in two jurisdictions, interview respondents 
did not specifically address job satisfaction.  Additionally, qualitative evidence exploring the link between 
unionization, bureaucratic red tape, and public service motivation is documented in previous chapters.  As such, I 
examine only quantitative data from union members in a single jurisdiction here. 
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Job satisfaction represents one of the most frequently studied correlates of unionization 
(Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992).  The most common result in the scholarly literature on 
labor unions illustrates that union commitment and collective bargaining processes increase 
union members‟ dissatisfaction (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Gordon, et al., 1980; Kochan, 1980; 
Kochan & Helfman, 1981).
3
  This finding is frequently explained in terms of the “voice 
hypothesis,” which suggests workers with less attractive and rewarding jobs internalize union 
values because unionization provides opportunities to rectify less desirable work elements 
(Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992; Freeman & Medoff, 1984).  A complimentary political 
explanation attributes member dissatisfaction to the activities of union leaders.  This 
interpretation suggests that union leaders build members‟ salary and benefits expectations 
beyond what is reasonable, and fail to deliver promised outcomes, thereby facilitating discontent 
(Hammer & Avgar, 2005; Ross, 1948).  While these studies do not specifically examine the 
public sector context it is reasonable to expect that: 
 
H1: Member commitment to union values will have a direct, negative effect on public 
sector job satisfaction. 
                                                 
3
 It is difficult to collectively interpret findings on the link between union commitment and job satisfaction because 
the directionality of the relationship is confounded.  While some studies argue that job dissatisfaction causes 
commitment to union values (Gordon, et al., 1980), others argue that unionization causes job dissatisfaction 
(Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Ross, 1948).  To complicate matters some argue that the relationship between 
commitment to union values and job related attitudes is likely a reciprocal process (Redman & Snape, 2005).  I 
argue here, from an institutionalist perspective, that the social groups to which individuals belong shape attitudes, 
beliefs, values, and ultimately behavior.  As such, the institutional perspective suggests that commitment to union 
values causes job dissatisfaction rather than the opposite. 
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Union Commitment, Bureaucratic Red Tape, and Job Satisfaction.  In their sector-
specific theory of job satisfaction, however, Wright and Davis (2003) point out that “the key to 
understanding any potential sector differences in employee job satisfaction is to consider ways in 
which the public sector work context differs from the private sector” (p. 75).  Drawing from 
Buchanan (1975), Wright and Davis (2003) argue that more prevalent elements of the public 
sector work context, such as bureaucratic red tape and increased procedural constraints, reduce 
job satisfaction.  Research consistently shows that bureaucratic red tape, defined as pathological 
organizational rules, reduces overall job satisfaction (Baldwin, 1990; Buchanan, 1975; DeHart-
Davis & Pandey, 2005; Lan & Rainey, 1992; Snizek & Bullard, 1983; Wright & Davis, 2003).  
Public employees experience several negative psychological consequences, such as purposeless 
and alienation, when exposed to high levels of bureaucratic red tape  (DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 
2005). These negative emotions decrease job satisfaction by limiting the perceived degree of 
responsibility employees have over work outcomes (Hackman & Oldham, 1976).  Furthermore, 
bureaucratic red tape encourages hardening of work routines and can confine employees to 
strictly following the organization‟s formal rule requirements (Pandey & Scott, 2002).  Routine 
work, in turn, encourages employees to perceive work as less socially meaningful, thereby 
decreasing job satisfaction (Hackman & Oldham, 1976).   
Unions, however, may meaningfully influence the public sector work context by reducing 
perceived red tape for committed union members.  As Bozeman (1993) points out,  
“administrative rules, regulations, and procedures are not … inherently good or bad, but only 
good or bad from the perspective of values posited and the extent to which they seem to serve or 
thwart those values” (p. 283-284).  Unions seek to protect the fundamental value of individual 
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and employee rights by establishing rule-oriented value protections through the collective 
bargaining process (Klingner, et al., 2010).  These rule-oriented protections often limit the ability 
of managers to make arbitrary personnel decisions (A. K. Donahue, et al., 2000), which reduces 
feelings of alienation and exploitation for members committed to union values (Barling, et al., 
1991).  Increased purpose and meaningfulness of work, in turn, leads to greater satisfaction 
(Hackman & Oldham, 1976).  Given that red tape is a significant predictor of job satisfaction in 
the public sector, and that collective bargaining may decrease perceptions of red tape for 
members committed to union values, I hypothesize that: 
 
H2: Commitment to union values will have an indirect, positive effect on public sector 
job satisfaction by reducing member perceptions of red tape. 
 
Union Commitment, PSM, and Job Satisfaction.   Wright and Davis (2003) also point out 
that job characteristics distinct to the public sector can influence job satisfaction.  The ability to 
positively influence the lives of others constitutes one job characteristic often thought to be more 
heavily emphasized by public employees (Crewson, 1997).  Some scholars argue that public 
employees are more likely to be characterized unique service ethic, or public service motivation 
(Perry & Wise, 1990; Rainey, 1982, 2003).
 4
  Perry and Wise (1990) developed the term public 
                                                 
4
 Recent trends in PSM theory, however, employ the term more broadly in reference not to an individual‟s aspiration 
to work for government, but rather to describe an individual‟s desire to serve the public good, sacrifice for the 
benefit of others, and promote the well-being of the collectivity (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008b). As such, PSM is 
closely related to other commonly used terms in public management, as well as other scholarly disciplines, including 
the service ethic, public service ethos, altruism, and prosocial behavior (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008b; Rainey, 2003). 
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service motivation to describe individuals predisposed to “respond to motives grounded 
primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations” (p. 368).  Because one major 
characteristic of public sector jobs is the opportunity to positively impact the lives of others, 
those individuals who display higher PSM exhibit greater satisfaction with public sector work 
(Brewer & Selden, 1998; Cerase & Farinell, 2006; Kim, 2005; Naff & Crum, 1999; Norris, 
2003).   PSM, however is not void of social context, and the norms and values attached to social 
structures affect PSM (Perry, 1997, 2000; Perry & Vandenabeele, 2008). 
While commitment to union values does not specifically influence the characteristics of 
public sector jobs, it may impact the significance individuals attribute to specific job 
characteristics by increasing PSM.  Unions, as social structures, emphasize protection of 
employee and individual rights as the fundamental value (Gordon & Lee, 1990; Klingner, et al., 
2010; Kochan, 1980).  The distinct values tied to unionism stem from the belief that employers 
wield significant power over employees, and laborers must collectively even the balance of 
power between labor and management (Parboteeah & Cullen, 2003).  Union members often seek 
to advance the collective good of the labor organization, which communicates many of the same 
values give rise to PSM (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008b; Perry & Vandenabeele, 2008). 
Commitment to union values may positively influence PSM by encouraging feelings loyalty, 
connectedness, selflessness, and pride with respect to the labor organization and working class 
(Gordon, et al., 1980; Kelloway, et al., 1992).  Because those individuals who display higher 
PSM are more satisfied with public sector work, and commitment to union values facilitates the 
motives and emotions that enhance PSM, I expect that: 
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H3: Member commitment to union values will have an indirect, positive effect on public 
sector job satisfaction by increasing public service motivation. 
 
Model Controls.  Although this chapter focuses on the direct and indirect relationships 
between commitment to union values and public sector job satisfaction potential alternative 
explanations exist.  First, research suggests that union socialization impacts commitment to 
union values (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992), bureaucratic red tape (see chapter 3), PSM 
(Davis, 2010), and job satisfaction (Freeman & Medoff, 1984).  To control for the effects of 
union socialization, I include a construct in the model designed to tap socialization experiences 
(e.g. attendance at union meetings and informal gatherings).  Second, demographic categories 
including education, gender, and race influence union commitment (Angle & Perry, 1981; 
Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992), public service motivation (DeHart-Davis, et al., 2006; 
Pandey & Stazyk, 2008; Perry, 1997)
 5
, and job satisfaction (Clark, 1997; Weaver, 1977). I 
include these variables as covariates of union commitment, public service motivation, and job 
satisfaction.  Some research also illustrates that women perceive bureaucracy and formal rules 
differently from men (DeHart-Davis, 2009a).  Although race and gender are often insignificant 
in bureaucratic red tape studies (Pandey & Kingsley, 2000; Rainey, et al., 1995; P. G. Scott & 
Pandey, 2000), I included those demographic characteristics in the model to rule out possible 
alternative explanations. Finally, not all unions display similar motives and attitudes (Visser, 
2006). I also included two variables to control for membership in police and fire unions, because 
they are the most heavily unionized municipal government departments.  The following section 
                                                 
5
 Several PSM studies illustrate the positive influence of professionalism on PSM (see Pandey and Stazyk, 2008 for 
a comprehensive review).  I employ the education variable here as a proxy for professional status. 
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presents statistical tests of the research hypotheses suggesting that unionization indirectly 
increases job satisfaction by influencing sources of satisfaction unique to the public sector.    
Findings 
Prior to explaining the statistical findings it is necessary to discuss a few points in terms 
of model specification and estimation.  First, as in previous chapters the union socialization 
construct is defined by only two indicators.  For model identification purposes I have constrained 
the factor loadings associated with attendance at union meetings and social interaction with 
union members to equality.  Second, public service motivation researchers have questioned the 
existence of the attraction to policy making dimension as a component of the higher order public 
service motivation construct.
6
  As Perry (1996) suggests, the attraction to policy making 
subscale, because it is composed “entirely of negatively worded items … confounds whether the 
subscale taps the attraction to policy making dimension…” (p. 20).  Although not depicted in the 
diagram, I loaded each reverse scaled PSM item on a negative wording construct.
7
  The negative 
wording construct extracts the shared variance in the attraction to policy making items due to 
negative wording from true attraction to policy making construct.  As such, the remaining 
variance more closely taps attraction to policy making.  Third, red tape is depicted as a box in the 
                                                 
6
 In fact, some PSM researchers have excluded the attraction to policy making dimension from attempts to validate 
construct measurement (Coursey, et al., 2008).  I include the attraction to policy making dimension here for two 
reasons.  First, a substantial number of research studies continues to validate union activity in the policy making 
process.  Second, public policy making, whether formal or informal, is an important component of public sector 
work environments, particularly for street-level workers (Lipsky, 1980).   
7
 The negative wording construct is defined by five items, all of which are negatively worded.  It includes the three 
attraction to policy making items and two other negatively worded items from the compassion sub-dimension. 
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diagram because the construct is defined by a single indicator.  Finally, the initial model 
estimates returned one inadmissible solution, a negative residual variance associated with the 
commitment to public interest dimension of PSM.  To address this I constrained the residual 
variance to zero, and tested for significant changes in model fit.  The results of a
2 difference 
test on one degree of freedom reveal that constraining the negative residual variance to zero does 
not significantly reduce model fit (
2 3.144, .0762p   ) .  As such, all subsequent models 
were estimated with this model constraint in place.  
Before interpreting parameter estimates and variance explained it is necessary to 
determine if the overall model fits the data well.  General guidelines suggest that .08RMSEA , 
.90CFI  , and .90NNFI   indicate good fitting models (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993; Marsh, et 
al., 2004).  The findings presented in the model surpass the suggested cutoff criteria for all three 
measures of model fit.  Because the model fits the data well it is reasonable to proceed with 
analysis of parameter estimates associated with hypothesized relationships. Consistent with 
previous research, both commitment to union values (Gordon, et al., 1980; Kelloway, et al., 
1992) and public service motivation (Coursey, et al., 2008; Perry, 1996) are modeled as higher 
order constructs with multiple component dimensions.  As such, the pathways between higher 
order constructs and associated sub-dimensions can be interpreted as factor loadings.  
Alternatively, the unidirectional beta pathways between union commitment, red tape, PSM, and 
job satisfaction can be interpreted as regression coefficients, and the bidirectional pathway 
between red tape and PSM can be interpreted as a correlation.  Table 5.1 presents the factor 
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loadings associated with all manifest variables
8
, and the model presented in figure 5.1 provides 
the model fit statistics and parameter estimates.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 5.1] 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5.1] 
 
All five of the hypothesized parameters, both direct and indirect, significantly contribute 
to the overall fit of the model.  Because all indicators in this model are categorical, traditional 
2 difference testing to determine parameter significance is not appropriate.  As such, each beta 
path was tested for significance using the 
2 difference testing option for categorical variables in 
Mplus (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2010).  The 
2 column provides an accurate depiction of 
overall change in model fit when a given beta path was absent from the model.   The direct path 
between commitment to union values and job satisfaction is significant at the .05 level, whereas 
all other parameters are significant at the .01 level or greater.  Table 5.2 illustrates the change in 
model
2 , and associated significance levels, when a given regression parameter was constrained 
to zero.     
 
                                                 
8
 The inclusion of the negative wording construct substantially reduced the factor loadings for the attraction to 
policy making items with respect to the attraction to policy making construct.  However, after extracting negative 
wording variance the attraction to policy making dimension represents an important component of the higher order 
PSM construct.   
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[INSERT TABLE 5.2] 
 
The results presented in figure also 5.1 illustrate the complex relationship between 
commitment to union values and job satisfaction in the public sector.  First, those public 
employees reporting greater commitment to the union also report significantly higher job 
satisfaction.  The direction of the relationship, however, is positive, which contradicts the 
negative hypothesized relationship.  Second, the model provides evidence suggesting that union 
commitment indirectly influences public sector job satisfaction through both red tape and PSM.  
Those employees reporting more commitment to union values report significantly less red tape, 
and those employees reporting more red tape also report less job satisfaction.  These 
relationships suggest that member commitment to union values increases job satisfaction 
indirectly by decreasing red tape.  Additionally, union members more committed to the union 
report greater PSM.  Those reporting higher PSM, in turn, are also more satisfied with the nature 
of public sector work.  As such, commitment to union values indirectly increases job satisfaction 
by increasing public service motivation.   
Although figure 5.1 presents several direct regression parameters, it does not provide 
information on the total indirect effect on job satisfaction.  Total indirect effects are estimated as 
the product of multiple direct effects (Kline, 2005).  In this model the indirect effect of union 
commitment on job satisfaction through red tape is .076 (p = 0.022), and the indirect effect of 
union commitment on job satisfaction through PSM is .215 (p = 0.001).  The total indirect effect 
of union commitment on job satisfaction is estimated as the sum of all indirect effects (Kline, 
2005), in this case the total indirect effect of union commitment on job satisfaction is .291 (p = 
<0.001).  Finally, the total effect of commitment to union values on job satisfaction is calculated 
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by adding the direct effect to the total indirect effect.  The results presented in figure 5.1 
illustrate that the total effect of union commitment on job satisfaction is .562.
 9
  Practically 
speaking the model suggests that the overall impact of commitment to union values on job 
satisfaction is relatively strong and positive. 
Finally, unlike traditional regression models, which calculate one 2R value, there are 
multiple 2R values in structural models corresponding to each exogenous variable.  First, the 
findings illustrate that the model controls explain 66.4% of the variance in commitment to union 
values.  Second, the model controls and commitment to union values explain 5.9% of the 
variance in red tape and 17.7% of the variance in public service motivation.  Finally, the overall 
model explains a relatively large portion of the variance in job satisfaction, 33.2%.  Although a 
relatively small proportion of the variance in red tape is explained by the model, the remaining 
R
2
 values indicate that this model has relatively good explanatory capacity.    
  Although this chapter focuses on the direct and indirect relationships between 
commitment to union values and job satisfaction, the results suggest that there are some 
significant relationships between the control variables and other model constructs.  First, fire 
fighters tend to be more dissatisfied with their jobs, but no other control variables are significant 
predictors of job satisfaction. Second, those individuals who more frequently interact with other 
union members report higher levels of red tape.  Finally, the results indicate that three model 
controls are significantly related to commitment to union values.  Survey respondents who report 
more interaction in union socialization experiences (e.g. meetings and informal gatherings) 
                                                 
9
 Although Mplus does not provide a p-value associated with the total effect, both the total indirect effect and the 
direct effect are significant at the .05 level.  As such, it is reasonable to conclude that the total effect, comprised of 
both direct and indirect relationships, is also significant. 
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report significantly more commitment to union values. Additionally, police officers and fire 
fighters report significantly more commitment to union values.  This is not surprising given they 
are the most heavily unionized municipal government departments examined here.  Table 5.3 
provides the standardized parameter estimates and significance levels for all control variables 
included in the model.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 5.3] 
 
Discussion 
The literature on labor relations frequently asserts that unionization contributes to job 
dissatisfaction (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992; C. J. Berger, et al., 1983; Borjas, 1979; 
Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Kochan, 1980; Kochan & Helfman, 1981; Ross, 1948), but these 
studies focus primarily on private sector unions and neglect sources of work satisfaction more 
prevalent in public organizations.  This chapter sought to examine union members‟ job 
satisfaction in public sector work environments.  I argued here that unionization in the public 
sector can increase members‟ job satisfaction by favorably altering the work context and 
reinforcing the attitudes and emotions that give rise to public service motivation within the 
boundaries of the labor organization. 
Perhaps the most interesting result concerns the positive direct relationship between 
commitment to union values and job satisfaction, which contradicts previous research.  Those 
individuals more committed to the labor organization also report higher levels of overall job 
satisfaction.  Although this findings is surprising in light of substantial evidence pointing to 
unionization as a cause of member dissatisfaction, unions are integral in minimizing wage 
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inequality and increasing member autonomy with respect to the work organization (Pfeffer & 
Davis-Blake, 1990).  The findings I present here are consistent with arguments that unions can 
increase member satisfaction, and support the assertion that favorably altering the work context 
serves as a mechanism by which unions indirectly influence job satisfaction.      
The major element of the work context examined in this chapter is bureaucratic red tape, 
or pathological organizational rules that fail to achieve their purposes (Bozeman, 1993, 2000).  
Not surprisingly, those members more committed to union values perceive less bureaucratic red 
tape.  Although formal organizational rules are more numerous in unionized environments 
(Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Gallagher, 1983), members committed union members tend to 
perceive these rules favorably.  Union members‟ favorable assessment of organizational rules 
may stem from the fact that collective bargaining agreements establish rule-oriented protection 
of employee rights, the fundamental value associated with unionism.  One caveat is in order, 
however, because this chapter examines union member perceptions of organizational rules, 
broadly construed.  Union members might be expected to view those rules specifically associated 
with the labor contract even more favorably, but that hypothesis cannot be tested here.   
Although not specifically an element of the work context, commitment to union values 
appears to trigger the attitudes and emotions that give rise to public service motivation.  
Although this finding contradicts assertions that unions are primarily self-interested (Moe, 2006, 
2009), it is understandable from the perspective of organizational psychologists exploring the 
causes and consequences of union commitment.  Research suggests that commitment to the 
union is associated with feelings of loyalty to the labor union, willingness to personally sacrifice 
for other union members, and a sense of responsibility to advance the collective good of the 
union (Gordon, et al., 1980; Kelloway, et al., 1992).  Although many of these emotions also give 
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rise to PSM (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008b; Perry & Wise, 1990), scholarship has yet to 
emphasize role social boundaries play in understanding PSM.  An intriguing question for future 
research would ask: does increased compassion and self-sacrifice with respect to a given social 
group (e.g. fellow labor union members) translate into increased compassion and self-sacrifice 
for other social groups?   
The direct linkages between union commitment and bureaucratic red tape, as well as 
union commitment and PSM, have implications for the overall influence of commitment to union 
values on job satisfaction.   First, empirical research finds that a high level of bureaucratic red 
tape and excessive procedural constraints consistently lower job satisfaction (Baldwin, 1990; 
Buchanan, 1975; DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005; Lan & Rainey, 1992; Snizek & Bullard, 1983; 
Wright & Davis, 2003).  This chapter suggests that commitment to union values decreases 
perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, thereby indirectly increasing job satisfaction.  Second, 
public service motivation scholars have uniformly asserted that those individuals with higher 
PSM view public employment as a source of intrinsic satisfaction (Brewer & Selden, 1998; 
Cerase & Farinell, 2006; Kim, 2005; Naff & Crum, 1999; Norris, 2003).  This research provides 
evidence that union commitment increases PSM.  As such, commitment to union values 
indirectly increases job satisfaction by increasing PSM. 
The magnitude of all effects, both direct and indirect, of union commitment on job 
satisfaction provide additional insights into the sources of satisfaction in the public sector.  First, 
the direct effect of commitment to union values on job satisfaction (.271) is larger than its total 
indirect effect through both red tape (.076) and PSM (.215).  This suggests that the independent 
influence of commitment to union values in this research outstrips both indirect relationships.  
This finding could potentially be explained by other variables not measured here.  For example, 
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Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1990) suggest that unions increase job satisfaction by minimizing wage 
inequality.  Future research should be designed to explore how unionization influences member 
perceptions of organizational justice, and by extension job satisfaction.  Second, the effect of 
union commitment on job satisfaction via PSM is considerably larger than its effect through red 
tape.  This finding suggests that the psychological impacts of unions on their members may be 
more important for job satisfaction than the effects of collective bargaining agreements on the 
work context.  Although this claim cannot be explicitly tested in this chapter, and future research 
could begin to untangle the relationships between the individual and organizational effects of 
public sector unionism. 
The results from this analysis, however, should be viewed with some caution for three 
reasons.  First, although the quantitative data taps employee perceptions throughout the 
organizational hierarchy, all data were collected in a single municipal organization.  The findings 
I report here may not translate to other municipal organizations or other levels of government.  
Second, all interview respondents worked in the state of Kansas.  Due to vastly different 
collective bargaining regulations in other states, the generalizability of these findings is limited.  
Finally, all data were collected at a single time point.  Complex indirect, or mediated, 
relationships take time to unfold, and mediation models are likely biased in cross-sectional data 
(Cole & Maxwell, 2003; Maxwell & Cole, 2007).  Future research should seek to assess the 
causal relationships between these constructs with longitudinal data.  These limitations, however, 
do not prevent this research from taking a first step in examining the complex relationship 
between job satisfaction and public sector unionism.  These findings suggest that the labor union, 
as a social structure within municipal government organizations, serves as an important source of 
several work related attitudes and behaviors.   
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Summary and Conclusion 
   It is interesting that relatively little research in public administration examines the 
psychological effects of unionism in the public sector, particularly because the public sector is so 
heavily unionized.  Perhaps this is because public administration, due to its emphasis on 
government organizations as the object of study, has become more interested in the politics of 
unionization.  Likewise, union members may perceive managerial favoritism by public 
administration scholars, and may view scholarly efforts to examine public unionism – and collect 
data from union members – with some skepticism.  Nonetheless, labor unions represent a major 
component of the public sector work environment with the ability to influence the work related 
attitudes of government employees.  Although the power and influence of public sector unions 
vacillates over time, they are likely to remain an integral component of the public sector work 
environment (Kearney, 1992, 2010).  As such, research on public sector unions can contribute to 
a broader understanding of how employees behave in public sector settings. 
 This chapter takes an important step in exploring the influence of public unions on 
members‟ job satisfaction by exploring elements of the work context more prevalent in public 
organizations.  The findings I present here suggest that public union members‟ commitment to 
union values encourages heightened job satisfaction.  In addition to the direct relationship 
between commitment to union values, union commitment indirectly increases job satisfaction by 
reducing union member perceptions of red tape and increasing member PSM.  Based on these 
findings future research in public administration cannot assume that unions are inherently 
detrimental to organizational performance.  Rather, by encouraging commitment to the nature of 
work and increased job satisfaction, unionization could potentially increase the performance of 
public organizations.  The following chapter provides some general concluding remarks on the 
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influence of public sector unions on members, points to some research limitations, and briefly 
discusses directions for future study. 
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Illustrations 
 
Table 5.1: Standardized Factor Loadings 
 
Standardized Estimates
MEETINGS 0.846 0.716
UNIONINT 0.846 0.716
WWU1 0.978 0.956
WWU2 0.896 0.803
WWU3 0.939 0.882
LOY1 0.884 0.781
LOY2 0.857 0.734
LOY3 0.854 0.729
LOY4 0.901 0.811
LOY5 0.935 0.875
LOY6 0.868 0.754
RTU1 0.705 0.497
RTU2 0.873 0.763
RTU3 0.821 0.674
RTU4 0.797 0.636
APM1 (Reversed) 0.126 0.016
APM2 (Reversed) 0.314 0.099
APM3 (Reversed) 0.573 0.328
COM1 0.461 0.212
COM2 0.349 0.122
COM3 (Reversed) 0.615 0.378
COM4 (Reversed) 0.475 0.226
COM5 0.644 0.414
CPI1 0.662 0.438
CPI2 0.792 0.627
CPI3 0.829 0.688
SS1 0.626 0.392
SS2 0.745 0.555
SS3 0.600 0.360
SS4 0.424 0.180
Scale Items
Self-Sacrifice
Commitment to the Public Interest
Compassion
Attraction to Policy Making
Responsibility to the Union
Loyalty to the Union
Union Socialization
Willingness to Work for the Union
2R
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Table 4.1: Standardized Factor Loadings Continued 
 
Standardized Estimates
JS1 0.613 0.376
JS2 0.952 0.906
JS3 0.841 0.706
APM1 (Reversed) 0.754 0.569
APM2 (Reversed) 0.294 0.086
APM3 (Reversed) 0.758 0.575
COM3 (Reversed) 0.006 0.000
COM4 (Reversed) 0.338 0.114
Scale Items
Negative Wording
Job Satisfaction
2R
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Figure 5.1: Standardized Parameter Estimates (Job Satisfaction) 
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Table 5.2: Regression Parameter Significance Levels (Job Satisfaction) 
df p
Full Model 658 NA NA NA
Job Satisfaction
Union Commitment 659 4.967 1 0.026
Red Tape 659 24.633 1 <0.001
PSM 659 43.082 1 <0.001
Red Tape
Union Commitment 659 7.511 1 0.006
PSM
Union Commitment 659 16.174 1 <0.001
Model
2 df
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Table 5.3: Standardized Model Control Parameter Estimates (Job Satisfaction) 
b SE Z p
Union Socialization -0.096 0.080 -0.740 0.460
Fire Fighter -0.255 0.113 -4.740 0.007
Police Officer -0.018 0.081 -2.961 0.768
College Degree -0.104 0.072 1.939 0.052
Female -0.032 0.076 -0.567 0.571
White -0.018 0.097 -0.303 0.762
Union Socialization -0.278 0.020 -1.053 0.292
Fire Fighter -0.008 0.016 -0.105 0.916
Police Officer -0.162 0.023 -1.096 0.273
College Degree 0.096 0.028 1.004 0.316
Female 0.197 0.028 1.178 0.239
White -0.041 0.012 -0.683 0.495
Union Socialization 0.316 0.324 2.652 0.008
Fire Fighter 0.049 0.500 0.717 0.473
Police Officer 0.100 0.384 1.483 0.138
College Degree 0.002 0.342 0.035 0.972
Female -0.092 0.350 -1.574 0.115
White 0.098 0.484 1.486 0.137
Union Socialization 0.743 0.032 20.570 <0.001
Fire Fighter 0.297 0.136 5.263 <0.001
Police Officer 0.206 0.112 3.441 0.001
College Degree -0.037 0.110 -0.658 0.511
Female -0.109 0.111 -1.919 0.055
White -0.049 0.133 -0.883 0.377
Union Commitment
Job Satisfaction
PSM
Red Tape
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Chapter 6  
Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
Although labor unions represent a significant presence in government organizations, 
recently legislators, managers, and citizens have focused on perceived negative consequences of 
unions in public sector work environments.  For example, in the early months of 2011 Wisconsin 
Republican Governor Scott Walker, citing massive budget shortfalls, introduced legislation 
designed to strip nearly all collective bargaining rights from many government employees.  
Union leaders met Walker‟s bill with fierce opposition and ultimately organized massive sit-ins 
at the Wisconsin state capital.   Some Wisconsin legislators – primarily Democratic – 
sympathetic to union concerns even vacated the state in protest, which temporarily delayed a 
vote on the bill.  The disagreement between organized labor and legislators in Wisconsin 
represents one of the more contentious collective bargaining deliberations in the country, but 
other states are experiencing similar debates.  Elected officials in Ohio and Tennessee have also 
introduced legislation that will repeal some collective bargaining rights for public employees.   
It is not surprising that state legislatures are proposing measures to limit collective 
bargaining in the public sector, particularly in a turbulent economic climate.  Throughout history 
the popularity of unions has fluctuated with shifting political and economic environmental 
conditions (Kearney, 1992). This fluctuation has been attributed to the tendency for legislators 
and managers to blame unions for increasing the cost of government (J. D. Donahue, 2008).  
Legislators facing budget crises view limits on collective bargaining as a mechanism to cut the 
cost of government, because unionized workers often receive higher compensation and more 
substantial benefits packages (Methé & Perry, 1980).  However, the fiscal advantages gained by 
limiting collective bargaining rights may be accompanied by unintended consequences for 
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government employees and organizations.  While limits on collective bargaining rights may 
result in reducing direct personnel costs (e.g. salaries and benefits), the empirical evidence I 
provide throughout this dissertation suggests that there are at least three reasons to question 
sweeping reforms designed to eliminate collective bargaining.   
First, the empirical findings in chapter 3 suggest that committed union members tend to 
view the organization‟s formal rule requirements more favorably.  When individuals favorably 
view organizational rules, they are more likely to voluntarily abide by rule requirements 
(DeHart-Davis, 2007, 2009b).  Voluntary rule compliance likely increases organizational 
efficiency by reducing the cost of compliance monitoring.  (DeHart-Davis, 2009b; Tyler, 2006).  
Although, as many reformers suggest, eliminating collective bargaining may trim personnel 
costs, these savings may be partially offset by efficiency reductions resulting from increased 
compliance monitoring.    
Second, the results I present in chapter 4 indicate that committed union members may be 
more likely to exhibit greater public service motivation (PSM).  Among the myriad 
organizational benefits arising from employing those with high PSM, researchers often point to 
differences in reward preferences.  Those individuals who display higher PSM are inclined to 
emphasize public service as a more important work reward compared to monetary incentives 
(Crewson, 1997; Houston, 2000; Rainey, 1982).  As such, severe limits on collective bargaining 
could unintentionally encourage employees stripped of union membership status to place greater 
emphasis on monetary rewards, by undermining the motives that give rise to PSM.   
Finally, the results I present in chapter 5 suggest that, under certain conditions, union 
membership can increase job satisfaction.  By decreasing perceived red tape and increasing 
PSM, committed union members tend to be more satisfied with the nature of public sector work.  
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Because job satisfaction is at least moderately correlated with individual performance (Judge, et 
al., 2001), unionization may serve to enhance individual and organizational performance under 
some circumstances.  As such, unionization may encourage heightened individual and 
organizational performance in the absence of additional monetary rewards.  While these three 
conclusions have not been explicitly tested here, a fruitful area of future research includes and in 
depth exploration of the linkages between unionization, organizational compliance monitoring, 
union member reward preferences, and individual performance.   
Research Limitations 
With these conclusions in mind, a few caveats are in order.  First, I want to point out that 
making normative claims regarding the appropriateness of public sector unions is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.  A substantial portion of research on unionization takes a biased 
perspective, and is designed to formulate recommendations designed to facilitate managerial 
attempts to minimize the prevalence of organized labor (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992).  
Managerial favoritism has not escaped public management and administration scholarship 
examining labor unions.  As Riccucci (2011) illustrates, the “raison d‟être [of the field of public 
administration] has historically been to promote good management. Thus, the profession as a 
whole has tended to portray labor unions as an interference with a government‟s ability to be 
efficient and effective” (p. 205).  Because many scholars in public administration view unions as 
an organizational malady, the literature has largely ignored exploring public sector unions from 
the perspective of members.  This research was designed to add depth to public administration 
research on unions by examining the psychological influence of unions‟ on their members, as 
opposed to previous research primarily emphasizing the managerial perspective.   
111 
Second, the research presented here has some important limitations that may confine the 
conclusions I provide to specific times and places.  All data used in this project, both quantitative 
and qualitative, were collected in Kansas.  The regulations that govern collective bargaining vary 
substantially between states.  Kansas is a “right to work” state, which means that employers 
cannot deny employment to any person due to union membership status, which may color the 
perspectives of union members toward the work environment.    As such, the findings I present 
here may not be generalizable to union contexts in other states.  Additional research should be 
designed to determine if these findings hold in other states.   
Furthermore, all employees participating in the interview and survey processes worked in 
municipal government.  While the heavily unionized context of municipal government makes it 
ideal for examining public sector unionism, it may not be reasonable to transfer these finding to 
other levels of government.   The cross sectional nature of the data also make it impossible to 
examine how the union and its members interact over time to shape values, beliefs and attitudes.  
While it is reasonable to view the union socialization process as reciprocal (Redman & Snape, 
2005) , unfortunately the data do not allow for testing these effects.   
A final limitation arises because member perspectives in relation to social boundaries 
were not explicitly examined here.  I examined organizational rules broadly, as opposed to 
exploring rules specifically associated with the labor contract.  How would union member 
perspectives change if asked about human resources red tape or about only those rules attached 
to the labor contract?  It is logical to conclude that union members would perceive these rules 
even more favorably, but that question is open for investigation.  Likewise, PSM research has 
proceeded on the assumption that higher levels of PSM translate into prosocial behaviors 
directed toward all other social groups.  As Perry and Hondeghem (2008a)  point out PSM is 
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related to “other-regarding” intentions such as altruism, but “the scope of who the „other‟ is 
might vary from individuals to organizations to society at large” (p. 295).  Do the increases in 
PSM I find reflect the labor organization or society at large as union members‟ reference point?  
Do unions facilitate an “us-versus-them” mentality?  Again, these questions are open for further 
investigation. 
Directions for Future Research 
These limitations do not prevent this research from taking an important first step toward 
understanding the psychological influence of unions in public sector work environments, but I 
have only scratched the surface of the influence of unions on their members in the public sector.  
What do the results and conclusions I provide imply for future research on unionization in the 
public sector?  Given the distinctive elements of the public work environment, public 
administration and management scholarship could contribute to the broader literature on labor 
relations by developing theories of unionization based on distinctively public issues.  Although I 
focus here on distinctive structural and motivational elements of public organizations, other 
constructs unique to public administration and management are ripe for study.  For example, the 
research I present here presents a somewhat simplistic view of “public” unionism.  The 
publicness of government agencies, however, is a matter of degree (Bozeman & Bretschneider, 
1994).   Differences between public unions could potentially be explained by publicness of the 
organizational environments in which they are embedded.   
Further efforts to understand differences between public sector unions may also benefit 
from examining differences between “social” and “business” unionism.  Barling et al. (1992) 
draw a conceptual distinction between business unions, which focus primarily on workplace 
issues, and social unions, which “have fundamental societal change as their major bargaining 
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issue” (p. 197).  Although these business and social unionism likely overlap, examples of each 
can be found in public organizations.  For example, the mission of the Fraternal Order of Police 
reads, 
 
“To support and defend the Constitution of the United States; to inculcate loyalty and 
allegiance to the United States of America; to promote and foster the enforcement of law 
and order; to improve the individual and collective proficiency of our members in the 
performance of their duties; to encourage fraternal, educational, charitable and social 
activities among law enforcement officers; to advocate and strive for uniform application 
of the civil service merit system for appointment and promotion; to support the 
improvement of the standard of living and working conditions of the law enforcement 
profession through every legal and ethical means available; to create and maintain 
tradition of esprit de corps insuring fidelity to duty under all conditions and 
circumstances; to cultivate a spirit of fraternalism and mutual helpfulness among our 
members and the people we serve; to increase the efficiency of the law enforcement 
profession and thus more firmly to establish the confidence of the public in the service 
dedicated to the protection of life and property” (The Grand Lodge Fraternal Order of 
Police, 2011). 
 
Alternatively, the mission of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME) includes, 
“Organizing workers in general, public employees in particular, promoting the welfare of 
AFSCME members and providing a voice in determining the terms and conditions of 
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employment by using the collective bargaining process, as well as legislative and 
political action, promoting civil service legislation and career service in government, 
assisting AFSCME members and affiliates through research and education, fostering 
cooperation among affiliates, cooperating with labor organizations and other groups 
toward the goals of a just distribution of America‟s material riches and a realization of 
the moral promise of American life, working with union members in other countries 
toward the improvement of life and work in all countries, reducing the use of armed force 
in resolving disputes, and toward solidarity of all workers” (AFSCME, 2011) 
These mission statements indicate that, while both organizations have both business and social 
elements, the FOP emphasizes more social elements, and AFSCME focuses more on business 
elements.  Can the knowledge accumulated based on business unionism inform our 
understanding of social unionism?  Is social unionism more prevalent in the public sector?  
These questions remain unanswered, but they can significantly enhance our understanding of the 
psychological effects of public sector unions on members. 
Additionally, scholars in public administration and management have revitalized research 
on, and developed an inventory of, public values (Bozeman, 2007; Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007).  
I argued throughout this dissertation, in line with Kilngner, Nalbandian, and Llorens (2010), that 
individual and employee rights is the fundamental value attached to unionism.  However, we 
know relatively little about how the preeminent union value of individual and employee rights 
relates to broader constellations of public values.  Does unionism facilitate some public values 
while suppressing others?  If so, what fundamental public values are attached to unionism?  Do 
different public and non-profit unions emphasize different constellations of public values?  
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While this dissertation begins an exploration of union values more research should be conducted 
to develop an understanding of the broader public value sets tied to public unionization. 
A final series of questions focuses on the links between unionization and governance.  
Public administration and management scholarship has devoted significant intellectual effort to 
understanding the causes and consequences of the inter-organizational relationships in which 
public agencies engage.  A significant portion of government contracts have been issued to non-
profit organizations, and some scholars point out the need a concentrated research emphasis on 
non-profit unionism (Kearney, 2010; Riccucci, 2011).  How, if at all, has the prevalence of 
government contracting changed the unionized component of the public workforce?  Are unions 
primarily found in non-profits more likely to engage in social unionism?  Are non-profit unions 
more similar to public or private sector unions?  All of the questions outlined above would serve 
as important bridges to link distinctively public issues to labor union research.     
Concluding Thoughts 
 While environmental conditions have contributed to decreasing unionization rates in the 
private sector, public union membership remains relatively high (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2009a; Kearney, 1992).  However, public unions have been challenged on the grounds that 
significantly increase the cost of government (J. D. Donahue, 2008).  While evidence suggests 
that unions do facilitate higher wages and benefit levels for members (Methé & Perry, 1980), 
they also influence members‟ attitudes, beliefs, and values.  Why has public administration and 
management literature largely ignored the potentially beneficial psychological outcomes of 
unionization?  Perhaps it is partially due to a pro management bias, but other factors likely 
contribute to this gap.  Unions are inherently difficult organizations to study, because they are 
skeptical that scholarly research may undermine their bargaining positions.  These research 
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difficulties, however, cannot deter public administration and management scholars from 
developing a broader understanding of employee unions.  Unions are likely to remain a major 
component of the public sector work environment, and public management theory must 
acknowledge their presence to develop an accurate picture of the public workplace. 
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol 
 
Please describe your job with the city. 
What led you to work for municipal government? 
What have you learned about public service since you have worked here? 
Please describe the most and least rewarding aspects of your work. 
Please describe a workplace rule you view as good or bad. 
 
Appendix B: Operational Definitions 
 
Bureaucratic Red Tape: 
Perceptions of bureaucratic red tape were gauged using a single survey item.  Respondents were 
asked to rate the level of red tape, defined as burdensome administrative policies and procedures 
that have a negative effects on organizational performance, on a scale between 0 and 10.    
Public Service Motivation: Attraction to Policy Making 
One‟s attraction to policy making was assessed using all three of Perry‟s (1996) measures rated 
on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  The items were reverse 
coded so higher values correspond with greater attraction to policy making.  Respondents were 
asked to assess agreement with the following statements: 
 APM1: Politics is a dirty word.  (Reversed) 
 APM2: The give and take of public policy making doesn‟t appeal to me.  (Reversed). 
 APM3: I don‟t care much for politicians.  (Reversed) 
Public Service Motivation: Compassion 
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Compassion was gauged using the five items from the adapted scale proposed by Coursey et al. 
(2008) rated on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  All items were 
scaled so higher values reflect higher levels of compassion.  Respondents were asked to assess 
agreement with the following statements: 
 COM1: Most social programs are too vital to do without. 
 COM2: It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress. 
 COM3: I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I don‟t know personally. 
(Reversed) 
 COM4: I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the first 
step to help themselves.  (Reversed) 
 COM5: I am often reminded by daily events how dependent we are on one another. 
Public Service Motivation: Commitment to the Public Interest 
Individual commitment to the public interest was gauged using the three items from the adapted 
scale proposed by Coursey et al. (2008) rated on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree.  Based on the scaling higher values correspond to more commitment to the public 
interest.  Respondents were asked to assess agreement with the following statements: 
 CPI1: I unselfishly contribute to my community.   
 CPI2: I consider public service my civic duty. 
 CPI3: Meaningful public service is very important to me. 
Public Service Motivation: Self-Sacrifice 
Self-Sacrifice was gauged using the four items from the adapted scale proposed by Coursey et al. 
(2008) rated on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  All items were 
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scaled so higher values reflect more self-sacrifice.  Respondents were asked to assess agreement 
with the following statements: 
 SS1: Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself.  
 SS2: Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements. 
 SS3: I feel people should give back to society more than they get from it. 
 SS4: I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone else. 
Job Satisfaction 
Job satisfaction was assessed using five items rated on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree.  All items were scaled so higher values reflect greater job satisfaction.  
Respondents were asked to assess agreement with the following statements: 
 JS1: Doing my job gives me a sense of personal satisfaction. 
 JS2: I am proud to work for this organization. 
 JS3: Overall, I am satisfied working for this organization. 
Union Commitment: Willingness to Work for the Union 
Willingness to work for the union was examined using three items rated on a 5 point scale 
ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  All items were scaled so higher values reflect 
more willingness to work for the union.  Respondents were asked to assess agreement with the 
following statements: 
 WWU1: I am willing to put in a great deal of time to make the union successful. 
 WWU2: If asked I would run for elected office in the union. 
 WWU3: If asked I would serve on a committee for the union. 
Union Commitment: Loyalty to the Union 
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Loyalty to the union was assessed using six items rated on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree.  All items were scaled so higher values reflect greater loyalty to the 
union.  Respondents were asked to assess agreement with the following statements: 
 LOY1: I talk up the union to my friends as a great organization to belong to. 
 LOY2: The record of the union is a good example of what dedicated people can get done. 
 LOY3: There's a lot to be gained by joining the union. 
 LOY4: Deciding to join the union was a smart move on my part. 
 LOY5: I feel a sense of pride in being a part of the union. 
 LOY6: Based on what I know now, and what I believe I can expect in the future, I plan to 
be a member of the union the rest of the time I work here. 
Union Commitment: Responsibility to the Union 
Responsibility to the union was gauged using four items rated on a 5 point scale ranging from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree.  All items were scaled so higher values reflect stronger 
feelings of responsibility to the union.  Respondents were asked to assess agreement with the 
following statements: 
 RTU1: Every member must be willing to take the time and risk of filing a grievance. 
 RTU2: It is every member's responsibility to see that the other members 'live up to' the 
collective agreement. 
 RTU3: It is the duty of every member to keep his/her ears open for information that 
might be useful to the union. 
 RTU4: It is every member‟s duty to support or help another worker use the grievance 
procedure. 
Union Socialization 
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The construct of labor union socialization was assessed using two measures rated on a 5 point 
scale ranging from quite frequently to never.  Items were reverse coded so that higher values 
indicate more participation in institutional and individual socialization experiences.  Respondents 
were asked to assess participation in union activities with the following questions: 
 MEETINGS: How often do you attend union meetings? (Reversed) 
 UNIONINT: How often do you interact with other union members outside of meetings 
and work? (Reversed) 
Model Controls 
This project uses a series of sociodemographic variables as covariates, or model controls.  The 
following demographic characteristics were collected in the survey instrument: 
 Race was dichotomized to reflect white and non-white employees. 
 Education was dichotomized to reflect those with a college degree and those without. 
 Role in the organization was dichotomized to include management and non-management. 
 Gender 
 Police Officer 
 Fire Fighter 
